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PRESENTATION
This is the sixth year that the weekly dispatches transmitted 
during a year by ECLAC Washington, to ECLAC Santiago and to other 
subregional offices, are gathered in a single document.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by 
subject and ordered chronologically within each chapter, with each 
heading indicating the relative saliency of those issues within the 
international economic agenda.
The three most important issues which dominated the 
international economic agenda, throughout the concluding year, are 
listed here according to what, avowedly, is a very subjective 
ordering of their relative importance.
1) The sluggish recovery experienced by the U.S. economy, 
since mid-1991 and into the first half of 1992, took its toll by 
contributing to the electoral defeat of the incumbent Republican 
Party, thus terminating its control of the Executive branch, which 
started with the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
The Democrats won the election by promising a more active role by 
government in the reactivation of the economy.
2) 1992 will be recorded as the year when the Bretton Woods 
institutions accomplished their universalization, by reaching more 
than one hundred and seventy members, including the republics of 
the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslav republics, 
Switzerland, Micronesia and even the tiny Republic of San Marino.
3) Finally, on international trade, by the end of the year, 
there was renewed hope that with the solution reached by the United 
States and the European Community on agricultural subsidies the 
Uruguay Round could be completed before the expiration in May 1993 
of the U.S. President's fast track authority. Additionally, the 
conclusion of the negotiations on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and its signature on December 17, signaling the 
beginning of the process of ratification in each one of the member 
countries, constituted the major event of 1992 in the field on 
international trade.
1 ECLAC Washington, International Economic Highlights. 1987 
(LC/WAS/L.2) 17 August 1988; 1988 (LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989; 1989 
(LC/WAS/L.8) 15 March 1990; 1990 (LC/WAS/L.11) 22 March 1991; 1991 
(LC/WAS/L.14) 11 March 1992.
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Some of these issues were described in the weekly dispatches 
transmitted regularly throughout the year. They are gathered here 
with the purpose of making them available for easier consultation, 
in case the Washington D.C. vantage point they present still has 
some testimonial value.
To conclude, those readers who are not familiarized with them 
should be reminded that each dispatch tries to remain within the 
self-imposed limit of 750 words, because their purpose is only to 
bring an issue to the reader's attention.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. 1992 LOOKS DIFFICULT
(WDW/1/92 22 January 1992)
Three major factors are contributing to some of the 
difficulties that can be expected in 1992. First, the reactivation 
of the U.S. economy is taking longer than expected; second, there 
is still no light at the end of the Uruguay Round; and third, 
against this background, the political campaign in the United 
States could generate some undesired surprises.
The sluggishness of the U.S. recovery was not anticipated and 
is generating a degree of unprecedented pessimism, particularly 
among white collar sectors and the middle class. Among the most 
disheartened, the prediction that the slump would be "short and 
shallow" has become a concern about the risk of a "double dip," or 
the possibility that the economy could fall into a new downturn.
However, this gloomy scenario is not confirmed by the 
"consensus forecast" revealed by a survey conducted by The Wall 
Street Journal, among 42 economists, who anticipate "a bleak 
winter, followed by a mild economic recovery starting this spring 
or early summer."
According to these predictions, the U.S. gross domestic 
product will grow, in real terms, at a 1.1% annual rate during the 
first half of the year and at 3% during the second half of the 
year.
This forecast is in agreement with the one issued by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that 
its 24 members' growth would average 2.2% in 1992, on account of 
the sluggishness in the performance of the biggest and most 
industrialized members. The slowness of the U.S. recovery will be 
accompanied by growth of 1.4% in Germany, with the Bundesbank 
pushing interest rates upwards, to the dismay of the other members 
of the European Community. Even mighty Japan will see its rate of 
growth fall to 2.4% in 1992, from 4.5% in 1991. Consequently, as 
declared by the World Bank's Chief Economist Lawrence Summers, "the 
economic train doesn't have a strong locomotive."
For the developing countries, also according to Mr. Summers, 
the slow growth in the industrialized economies will translate 
itself into reduced demand for their exports, lower prices for
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commodities and increased protectionist pressures.
In these terms, one of the few outstanding exceptions to these 
trends can be found in Latin America and the Caribbean. According 
to the Executive Secretary of ECLAC, Gert Rosenthal, quoted in The 
Washington Post, "the case can be made that Latin America can once 
again look forward to a rather long period of stable growth.”
Although he also warned that "the region's recovery could 
easily stall if the U.S. and European economies continue their 
lackluster performance.”
The second source of difficulties in 1992 stems from the 
impossibility of coming to an agreement within the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations. In these sluggish times, even an imperfect 
outcome is more attractive than a no-score outcome, that could 
signal the beginning of the breakdown of the multilateral trading 
system. At this point, it is not worthwhile to describe this bleak 
alternative, since the negotiations are still under way on the 
basis of the proposal presented by the Director General of GATT 
Arthur Dunkel, with the deadline for their conclusion agreed for 
mid-April.
Finally, the other source of difficulties in 1992 comes from 
the next elections in the United States, which could lead to the 
adoption of decisions that could be adequate politically but that 
might be disastrous for the economy, or that might be convenient in 
the short run but pernicious for the long term. Unfortunately, as 
Robert J. Samuelson said in The Washington Post, "the long term 
doesn't vote and doesn't have a lobby."
For instance, there is already an intense debate about the 
contents of the reactivation package, comprising increases in 
domestic spending and tax cuts, that President Bush will unveil on 
January 28 in his State of the Union message. The question is if 
the 1990 budget agreement will be respected, which can only be 
accomplished by shifting defense expenditures to finance the 
reactivation of the economy. As President Bush declared, "there are 
ways to live within the caps and then juggle around inside, but 
that would take new legislation."
Also, part of the political campaign is the issue of 
protectionism, which has already hurt the possibility that a North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be presented to Congress 
for approval during the electoral campaign. Even more worrisome is 
the emergence of what Lawrence Summers characterized as an "inward 
trend in the American political climate," whereby "both the right 
edges and the left edges of the American political spectrum are 
flirting with dangerous isolationism."
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Nonetheless, despite all these difficulties, there is still 
ground for a certain optimism. After all, by contrast with the 
'•hard sciences," predictions are not among the strongest fields of 
economics.
Just as a reminder, The Wall Street Journal mentions that none 
of the forecasters, surveyed six months before, could predict "how 
far down the Federal Reserve would drive short-term interest rates 
in 1991." Also, "in mid-1990, 35 of the 40 economists surveyed
predicted that the economy would continue expanding for at least 
another twelve months. Shortly thereafter, the recession began."
In other terms, as The Journal concluded, "it's frequently 
smart to bet against the consensus forecast."
I. 2. THE IMF'S FIRST WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WECn 
(WDW/13/92 20 MAY 1992)
This year's advanced copy of the first WEO, as usual, was made 
available by the IMF staff to the press before the Fund-Bank Spring 
meetings (WDW/12/92) . The full text will be published by the end of 
the month.
The advanced copy of the first WEO contains the following four 
chapters: 1) world economic prospects and policies; 2) the
industrial countries; 3) the developing countries and, a sign of 
the times, 4) the former centrally planned economies. This time, 
the advanced copy does not contain the medium term projections, 
which will be included as an annex to the final version.
The slowdown in the world economy "has proven more persistent 
than projected" in the second WEO of October 1991. This led to a 
downward revision of the original projections for 1992 to a 
sluggish rate of 1.5 percent. A more rapid increase in world growth 
will have to wait until 1993, when it is projected that the world 
economy will grow at an annual rate of 3 percent.
However, amidst "the sluggishness of many cyclical 
indicators," the WEO identifies "several positive aspects in the 
current situation." First, many industrial countries exhibit 
"moderate and generally declining rates of inflation," which has 
permitted a "substantial reduction of short-term interest rates." 
Second, by contrast with the previous two recessions, of 1974-75 
and 1980-82, there have not been "persistent supply-side 
disturbances from commodity markets." Third, some of the main 
causes of the weakness, such as the uncertainties emanating from 
the Middle East or the reduction in the high levels of indebtedness 
of households and corporations, are "no longer at work or are
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diminishing." Finally, another positive signal comes from the 
contrastingly strong performance of the developing countries, 
explained by the adjustment efforts of past years, as well as by 
the positive effects of declining interest rates.
Among the industrial countries, in the United States and 
Canada the indicators still point to what is characterized as "a 
hesitant recovery," while in Europe growth has been restrained by 
the persistence of high interest rates, influenced by the 
relatively high inflationary pressures in Germany. Finally, in 
Japan the slowdown was basically influenced by a sharp deceleration 
in the growth of fixed investment, although output still remains 
slightly above the estimated level of potential GNP.
The weakness of activity was accompanied in almost all the 
industrial countries by a moderation of inflationary pressures, 
with the notable exception of Germany, where the 12-month inflation 
rate reached 4.75 percent in March 1992.
The developing countries "are expected to see a strengthening 
in growth." Based on the standard assumption of a continued and 
sustained implementation of policies of adjustment and reform, 
"real GDP growth is projected to average 6 percent a year in 1992- 
93, compared with 3 1/2 percent in 1990-91." Much of this is 
explained by the recovery projected for the Middle East and by the 
relief provided to the heavily indebted countries by the decline in 
short-term interest rates in the United States and Japan.
In the Western Hemisphere, in 1991, developing countries were 
able to grow at an average of 3 percent, despite weak growth in 
export markets. Although performance remained uneven, assuming that 
"economic reforms progress, financial policies are managed 
prudently, and world trade recovers," as well as a moderate 
increase in commodity prices and continued net inflows of external 
resources, "growth in the Western Hemisphere countries is expected 
to continue to strengthen in 1992-93 and inflation to decline 
further."
The quality of fiscal adjustment is singled out as a crucial 
element of positive performance in developing countries. 
Specifically, a warning is issued against the "danger that fiscal 
adjustment may result in reduced expenditures for health and 
education." In support, evidence is mentioned of "the importance of 
such expenditure in improving the quality of the labor force." For 
instance, a recent study has concluded that "a shift in public 
expenditure toward education by 1 percentage point of GDP can 
contribute as much as 1 percent annually to the average per capita 
growth rate of output in developing countries."
In the context of the qualitative aspects of fiscal adjustment 
mention is also made of military expenditures, which "at an average
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of 4 1/2 percent of GDP. . .remain excessive in much of the 
developing world.” Thus, support is granted to "reallocating 
saving from reduced military spending to infrastructure investment 
and the formation of human capital or by using such saving to 
reduce budget deficits."
Finally, the slowdown in world activity reflected "the 
dramatic contraction of output in the "former centrally planned 
economies," now estimated to have amounted to 20 percent in 1990 
and 1991. While there are "signs that the contraction is beginning 
to bottom out in some of the Eastern European countries... in the 
republics of the former Soviet Union, where the reform process has 
barely started, further output losses may be in store." In 
conclusion, for the international community it is "a major 
challenge to respond to the needs of the republics for guidance and 
financial assistance as they struggle to overcome the legacies of 
the past."
Finally, an exhortation is made for the successful conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round.
I. 3. THE DECLINE OF PRIMARY COMMODITY PRICES 
(WDW/18/91 24 JUNE 1992)
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, that the prices of primary 
commodities tend to decline secularly relative to the prices of 
manufactured products, has been confirmed in an IMF Working Paper 
(WP/91/47), by James M. Boughton, titled Commodity and Manufacture 
Prices in the Lona Run.
This conclusion is derived from empirical tests extending 
earlier work and from data for the prices of primary commodities 
and manufactured goods since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
On the basis of this evidence, the paper shows that "there has been 
a stable negative trend in the relative price of commodities 
amounting to around 1/3 of one percent per annum, or about 40 
percent over the past 120 years." Also, parallel to this 
deterministic secular trend, the relative price of commodities, 
exhibits "a strong and significant tendency... to revert to its 
trend-adjusted mean level."
However, since 1985, "the relative price of commodities has 
plummeted to an unprecedented level, and that decline cannot be 
explained either by the longer-run trend or by the other variables 
of the model." Furthermore, what is considered "more disturbing" is 
that there has also been "a secular tendency for commodity prices 
to become more volatile," which "first appeared around the time of 
the first World War, but it has become much more marked since the
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Thus, in 1990, the relative price of commodities was "at the 
lowest level recorded: some 60 percent below the level that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the negative trend and major 
disturbances in market conditions." This recent decline is not 
unprecedented. In this century, there have been three times in 
which the relative price of commodities has "fallen more than 
thirty percent below trend: in the aftermath of World War I, after 
which commodity prices rapidly recovered in the boom period of the 
1920s; at the onset of the Great Depression, after which commodity 
prices remained relatively low until the end of the Second World 
War; and now."
Consequently, history suggests that for the relative price of 
commodities to recover, strong growth must prevail in the 
industrialized countries. However, the conclusion is drawn that the 
estimates presented in the paper, "must dampen even that degree of 
optimism, because the recent decline is not attributable to slow 
growth and is largely outside the realm of previous experience."
Several factors may help explain this unprecedented sharp 
decline. First, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar usually has a 
strong positive impact on commodity prices, making them cheaper in 
terms of the currencies of the other major industrialized countries 
and increasing their import demand. Even so, the U.S. dollar price 
of manufactures rose by some 35 percent from 1984 to 1990, which 
reveals the inflationary effect of dollar depreciation on the price 
of manufactures. The world prices of primary commodities, by 
contrast, "may have been less affected, perhaps because these 
commodities are more widely traded in more highly competitive 
markets." Another factor contributing to the decline in commodity 
prices could be the "increased competition among suppliers," as 
exporting countries sought increased revenues to service their 
debts. And third, several factors have affected the demand for 
specific commodities, such as health concerns against tropical oils 
and coffee; environmental concerns against phosphates; the 
weakening of international marketing arrangements, including 
coffee, cocoa and tin; bumper crops in cereals; as well as sharp 
increases in metals production to respond to earlier strong demand.
According to the World Bank, in 1990, non-fuel primary 
commodity prices "in aggregate nominal terms are estimated to have 
declined by 6.8%" Moreover, with the deflator used to derive the 
constant dollar values, known as the Manufacturing Unit Value 
(MUV), estimated to have increased by 6.3% in 1990, "the non-fuel 
commodity index measured in constant dollars fell 12.3%."
In 1991, non-fuel commodity prices in aggregate nominal terms 
are expected to remain unchanged and to increase by 3.3% in 1992. 
With the MUV expected to increase by 9% in 1991, "there is an
early 1970s.”
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expected decline in non-fuel commodity prices in real terms of 
8.3%," while the constant dollar index turns upwards in 1992—  
increasing by 2.1%.
For the medium term, the World Bank's Price Prospects for 
Major Primary Commodities 1990-2005 forecasts that "non-fuel 
primary commodity prices are expected to increase in both nominal 
and real terms over the 1993-2000 period." By contrast, over the 
2000-2005 period, non-fuel commodity prices are expected to decline 
in real terms.
These projections are based on the following assumptions. On 
the negative side, the geographic distribution of demand will 
continue shifting. Growth in industrial country demand for primary 
commodities is "likely to decelerate," due to slower growth in 
population and advances in the technology of substitution, away 
from industrial raw materials and toward synthetics.
On the positive side, population pressures in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia will heighten the requirements for food and 
feedstuffs, although "the availability of finance will be a key 
constraint to making demand effective." Additionally, the robust 
growth of the East and South Asian economies, as well as the 
reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union "will 
underpin strong demand for primary commodities."
I. 4. THE MUNICH SUMMIT
(WDW/21/92 15 JULY 1992)
It used to be that the term Munich conjured the nightmare of 
Neville Chamberlain appeasing Adolf Hitler, to the point that in 
almost every confrontation of the Cold War an overriding objective 
was "to avoid another Munich." More recently, Munich witnessed the 
terrorist attack against the Israeli athletes that came to 
participate in the Olympic Games of 1972.
This time, the celebration in Munich of the eighteenth annual 
summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations— Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States— did not add to the bleak images invoked by this city. If 
anything, the Munich Summit will probably be remembered for what 
did not happen in it.
This impression of uselessness in large part results from the 
expectations, which are sometimes deliberately heightened in 
anticipation of such a gathering. After all, it is very hard to 
accept that nothing important will come out from an event that 
brings together the leaders of the most powerful industrialized
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nations, accompanied by 1,800 officials, followed by 6,000 
accredited journalists and protected by 9,000 police officers, at 
a cost to the host government of US$21 million.
Beyond the numbers, this was also the first summit to be held 
after the demise of the Soviet Union. The last one, held in London, 
still saw the participation of President Gorbachev, in a special 
session that approved the special program of assistance to what was 
then still known as the Soviet Union.
In Munich it was the turn of Russia's President Yeltsin, who 
obtained approval for the disbursement of an IMF's first credit 
tranche of $1 billion, as a first step towards the disbursement of 
a $24 billion package previously approved in April and conditioned 
upon the fulfillment of profound macroeconomic reforms. For this 
reason, exhibiting a certain pragmatism, President Yeltsin declared 
that he was "very satisfied," since in his own terms "I didn't 
expect more and I didn't want less."
Still, the circumstances surrounding the seven leaders of the 
industrialized economies were not as propitious. First of all, 
there was what President Mitterand characterized as the "morose 
state of the world economy," whereby unemployment has reached 7.8 
percent in the United States and it remains above 10 percent in 
Western Europe. Additionally, most of the summitteers, with the 
exception of Prime Minister Major of Great Britain, were 
confronting decisive elections in the near future, while 
experiencing approval ratings of less than thirty percent.
In such circumstances, the results contained in the political 
and economic declarations, summarized by President Bush in a 
concluding press conference, were immediately judged as a major 
disappointment.
President Bush listed what he characterized as "five key 
accomplishments." First, "a solid consensus on strengthening world 
growth;" second, support for market reforms in Poland; third, 
"strong support for President Yeltsin's reform efforts;" fourth, 
commitment to the future of safe nuclear power, "by agreeing on a 
coordinated cooperative effort with Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union to improve the safety of Soviet-designed power 
reactors;" finally, several steps concerning Yugoslavia, "to 
contain the spread of ethnic violence."
The greatest disappointment was the absence of a breakthrough 
in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. In the terms of the 
final statement of the Munich Summit, "a successful Uruguay Round 
will be a significant contribution to the future of the world 
economy...we expect that an agreement can be reached before the end 
of 1992."
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Moreover, revealing that there had been an attempt to focus on 
the details, the statement recognized that "progress has been made 
on the issue of internal support in a way which is consistent with 
the reform of the common agricultural policy, on dealing with the 
volume of subsidized exports and on avoiding future disputes. These 
topics require further work. In addition, parties still have 
concerns in the areas of market access and trade in cereal 
substitutes that they seek to address."
The search for the culprit did not make itself wait. The New 
York Times editorialized, "Blame isn't hard to place. France, 
alone, refuses to negotiate." The Wall Street Journal revealed that 
it all boiled down to a confrontation between "two men who make 
little secret of their dislike for one another," U.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker and France's Foreign Minister Roland Dumas.
However, Secretary Baker, who now appears in charge of the 
GATT negotiations, admitted that "we are much, much closer now to 
the prospect of a Uruguay Round agreement than we were as recently 
as five weeks ago."
The relatively meager outcome of the Munich summit led some to 
question the usefulness of such gatherings, while others expressed 
skepticism about the leadership role of the United States. Be it as 
it may, in an election year, a very political explanation was also 
offered by a "political adviser’* to President Bush, who was 
anonymously quoted in The Washinc ;n Post. The White House, he 
said, had seen the summit "as an event to be gotten through with no 
disasters." The fear, among White House officials, was "that the 
Democrats would try to wrap it around our neck that the president 
was out hobnobbing at one of these hot-air events overseas with 
millions more unemployed."
I. 5. THE IMF'S SECOND WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WEO ï 
(WDW/26/92 23 SEPTEMBER 1992)
The advanced copy containing the excerpts of the second WEO 
was made available by the IMF staff, on 16 September, just before 
the annual Bank-Fund Meetings, held this year in Washington D.C., 
on September 18-24. The full text will be released by the end of 
next month.
The advanced copy of the second WEO contains the following 
chapters: I) overview; II) world economic situation and short-term 
prospects; III) improving conditions for stronger growth; IV) the 
experience of successfully adjusting developing countries; and V) 
institutional change and economic transformation in former 
centrally planned economies. The final version will also include
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three annexes: 1) asset price deflation, balance sheet adjustment, 
and financial fragility; 2) medium-term baseline projections and 
alternative scenarios; 3) the accuracy of World Economic Outlook 
projections for industrial and developing countries; as well as the 
full statistical appendix.
Wïe world economy is experiencing "the third major slowdown 
since the 1970s." Following the stagnation of 1991, "during the
next twelve months, world output is projected to expand by 1 
percent in 1992 and by 3 percent in 1993." Admittedly, this last 
growth rate is close to the average of the past two decades. The
difficulty, this time, is that both these growth rates are
"somewhat less than experienced after the two previous— and more 
pronounced— recessions of 1974-75 and 1981-82." The recovery is 
thus "modest compared with previous cyclical upturns."
On the bright side, progress in the reduction of inflation is
expected to continue, while world trade is predicted to grow from
the modest 2 1/4 percent of 1991 to 6 3/4 percent in 1993. Even 
so, the bottom line is that "the expansion continues to be slow and 
uneven, and the balance of risks remains on the downside."
The estimates and projections for 1992 and 1993, as well as 
those for the medium-term in 1994-97 are based on the following 
assumptions: unchanged policies; constant real effective exchange 
rates at their average level of August 1-7, 1992; a world oil price 
averaging $18.32 in 1992 and $18.21 in 1993, remaining unchanged in 
real terms in the medium term; and interest rates, represented by 
the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six months U.S. dollar 
deposits, of 3.9 percent in 1992, 4 1/4 percent in 1993, projected 
to gradually increase to 6 percent in 1997.
On the basis of these assumptions, in 1992, real GDP in the 
industrialized countries is expected to grow by 1 3/4 percent and 
by nearly 3 percent in 1993, which is about 1/2 of l percentage 
point lower than projected in the first WEO (WDW/13/92). On average 
for both 1992 and 1993, real GDP in the developing countries is 
expected to expand by 6 1/4 percent. In Eastern Europe as a whole, 
output is expected to decline further in 1992 but may expand 
moderately in 1993 for the first time since 1988. Finally, in the 
former Soviet Union overall output is projected to contract by 18 
percent in 1992, warning that any projections about these countries 
is "subject to considerable uncertainty."
In the "developing countries of the Western Hemisphere," 
growth is expected to remain broadly stable at about 2 3/4 percent 
in 1992 and then increase to 4 percent in 1993.
Also, a review of "the experience of successfully adjusting 
developing countries," reveals that capital inflows to Latin
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America increased from $12 1/2 billion in 1989 to about $25 1/2 
billion in 1990 and to $40 1/2 billion in 1991, with the bulk of 
these increases accounted by portfolio flows to Argentina, Mexico 
and Venezuela.
These capital flows into Latin America are explained because 
"the implementation of adjustment and structural policies has led 
to an increase in the credibility of the reform process and to 
renewed confidence in their economies." Even so, external factors 
are also considered important, since the implementation of reform 
policies preceded these inflows, as in the case of Chile and 
Mexico, and because "it was only when activity slowed and interest 
rates fell in the United States that there was an increase in 
capital inflows."
Non-fuel commodity prices are projected to increase in dollar 
terms by 1 1/2 percent in 1992 and by 2 3/4 percent in 1993, 
"reflecting the expected moderate recovery of world growth and the 
likely evolution of supply conditions." However, it appears likely 
that the decline in the prices of non-fuel commodities will 
continue as in 1991, when, influenced by the slowdown in the world 
economy and abundant supplies of certain agricultural commodities, 
they fell by 4 1/2 percent in dollar terms. In effect, the prices 
of all major commodity groups declined in 1991, especially those of 
metals and minerals (down 11 percent) and tropical beverages (down 
6 3/4 percent). Still, adding a positive note, the report notes 
that "the weakness of prices for nonfuel commodities contributed to 
the recent decline in inflation worldwide."
Finally, after "an unusually strong expansion during 1987-89," 
the volume of world trade grew 4 percent in 1990 and only 2 1/4 
percent in 1991. This relatively poor performance was due to "the 
cyclical slowdown in import demand in the industrial countries and 
the collapse of trade between the countries of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union." Contrastingly, in 1991, imports rose 12 
1/2 percent in Asia and increased by a spectacular 17 percent in 
the Western Hemisphere. In the short-run, world trade is expected 
to grow 4 1/2 percent in 1992 and 6 3/4 percent in 1993.
14
II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. THE REACTIVATION OF THE UNION 
(WDW/3/92 5 FEBRUARY 1992)
With this year's State of the Union message, President Bush 
has confirmed the postulate that the state of the economy is the 
most accurate predictor of electoral behavior. Consequently, in an 
election year, the President's message must be viewed as part of 
the political campaign that is already under way.
In the speech itself and in the budget proposal sent to 
Congress the next day, the President outlined a short-term policy 
to reactivate the economy, as well as a long-term plan, "to keep 
combustion going and to guarantee our place in the world economy."
For the short-term, besides an arms reduction proposal that 
immediately was judged as "too little" by the opposition, the 
package includes measures that the President can take on his own 
authority, such as an adjustment of income tax withholding tables, 
increasing the take-home pay of wage-earners by $25 billion in the 
coming year; acceleration of already appropriated federal spending; 
measures to alleviate the "credit crunch" and to reduce the burden 
of regulation; and "continue to support monetary policy that keeps 
both interest rates and inflation down"—  at 3.1 percent in 1991, 
inflation was the second lowest since 1967 and interest rates are 
at the lowest levels in two decades.
Thus, the President avoided the alternative of new tax cuts to 
stimulate the economy in the short-term. Instead, with the 
cooperation of Congress, the President proposes the approval of an 
investment tax allowance and the simplification of the alternative 
minimum tax depreciation; to stimulate the real state market and 
home ownership; to cut the capital gains tax rate from 28 to 15 
percent; and to extend federal unemployment benefits.
For the long-term, the President proposes record level 
expenditures in research and development, infrastructure, 
education, as well as to curtail crime and drug abuse; to expand 
trade and opening markets for exports, by means of the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
and the Enterprise for the Americas; health reform; budget 
discipline; financial sector reform; and a national energy 
strategy.
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The economic assumptions on which the budget proposal is based 
are preceded by a reminder by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), Richard Darman, that "the domestic 
economy has not recovered in the manner that had been widely 
forecast." This leads Mr. Darman to restate that "macroeconomics is 
a highly fallible 'science'; macroeconomists are often closer to 
each other than to reality." Thus, the "economic assumptions and 
sensitivities," on which the budget proposal is based, do not 
constitute "a forecast."
The expectation that the economy will soon experience "a 
sustained turnaround" is based on several factors: 1) interest
rates have fallen to their lowest levels and inflation has also 
eased; 2) economic policy is focused on reviving economic growth; 
3) households and businesses have begun to reduce the debt burdens 
amassed in the last decade; and 4) an improving economy will help 
to restore consumer and business confidence.
For 1992, real GDP is projected to grow at a yearly rate of 
2.2 percent, expected to increase to 3 percent per year starting in 
1993 through 1997. The unemployment rate is projected to decrease 
to s.ightly less than 7 percent in 1992 and to drop to a yearly 
rate of 5.3 percent in 1996 and 1997, Finally the rate of inflation 
is expected to remain from 1992 *;o 1997 at around 3.1 percent.
However, what Leonard Silk in The New York Times called "the 
real shocker in the President's long-range plan" is the budget 
deficit, projected to grow to 365.2 billion in 1993 and to decrease 
to 203.3 in 1997. This is in spite of the fact that the budget 
proposal, as stated in the OMB's Director Introduction, "does not 
require increasing any discretionary spending caps. It does not 
require transfers from one category of expenditure to another. 
And... can meet the pay-as-you go requirements." In other words, 
the budget proposal stays within tbe limits of the October 1990 bi­
partisan budget agreement.
The continued increase in the deficit, as explained by OMB's 
Director Darman, is because "the practical facts of political 
reality amount to a formula for rising deficits and rising debt." 
Consequently, "even with adherence to the discipline of the Budget 
Enforcement Act, the near-term outlook for debt and deficits 
remains unattractive."
Three major reasons are mentioned to explain this: 1) the 
carryover effect of rising debt, with the associated interest 
burden, and the coverage of deposit insurance; 2) the recession and 
the continuing weakness of the economy; and 3) the continuing 
unrestrained growth of so-called "mandatory programs," with health 
expenditures becoming increasingly dominant since they will soon 
exceed 15 percent of GDP.
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The overwhelming weight of these "mandatory" programs, those 
that "do not come up for annual review or decision either by the 
Congress or the President," is demonstrated because for 1993 they 
amount to $766.8 billion and $980.6 billion including interest, 
representing "over half of the federal budget (64.4 percent 
including interest)." Mr. Darman's conclusion follows that "the 
budget can be brought into balance in the intermediate term only by 
enacting both a growth agenda and restraint in the growth of 
'mandatory' programs." Obviously, this is not the sort of medicine 
that lends itself to be administered easily in an election year.
II. 2. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION 
(WDW/4/92 12 FEBRUARY 1992)
This year's Economic Report of the President has been 
overshadowed by the State of the Union Message, which outlined a 
short-term policy and a long-term program to reactivate the economy 
(WDW/3/92). In the letter of transmission to Congress, the 
President addresses the issue of the sluggish behavior of the 
economy, describing 1991 as "a challenging year," because as a 
result of the recession "output was stagnant and unemployment 
rose." Also, despite the fact that "signs of a moderate expansion 
began to appear in the spring... by the late summer, however, the 
economy flattened out and was sluggish through the rest of the 
year." This is "a reminder that even a well-functioning economy 
faces the risk of temporary setbacks from external shocks or other 
disturbances," particularly because "structural imbalances develop 
that can interrupt economic growth." An "unusual confluence of such 
imbalances" is described to explain the slowdown presently 
experienced. Some of these imbalances are found in the financial 
and real state sectors, as well as in household, corporate, and 
governmental debt, in the reallocation of resources from defense 
and in "a relatively tight monetary policy coupled with problems 
in the availability of credit."
However, "the fundamental conditions to generate economic 
growth are falling into place," such as the lowest levels of 
interest rates in decades, the slowdown in inflation, lean 
inventories and the improvement in international competitiveness, 
as evidenced by record levels of exports.
Still, the economy "faces serious economic challenges: to 
speed, strengthen, and sustain economic recovery; and, 
simultaneously, to provide a firmer basis for long-term growth in 
productivity, income, and employment opportunities." To address 
these issues the President refers to the State of the Union 
Message, as well as to the 1993 budget.
17
The annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers, that 
follows the President's message of transmission to Congress, is 
divided in the following chapters: 1) the American economy: 
responding to challenges; 2) recent developments and the economic 
outlook; 3) the labor market; 4) government and the level and 
distribution of income; 5) competitive forces and regulation; 6) 
open international markets and prosperity; and 7) economic 
statistics: measuring economic performance.
The first chapter links the President's message with the rest 
of the Report. particularly with the next chapter, which reviews 
recent developments and the economic outlook. The projection is 
"that the economy is likely to remain sluggish in the early part of 
1992 but that a renewed pickup is likely to begin in the middle of 
the year... the economy is then expected to return to solid real 
GDP growth of about 3 percent a year through the mid-1990s, and the 
unemployment rate is expected to decline from around 7 percent to 
less than 5 1/2 percent."
The centerpiece of the chapter on the labor market deals with 
the slackness in the rate of product ivity growth, understood as GDP 
per hour, which explains the slowdo.n in the growth of wages. Three 
broad explanations are presented to account for this result: 1) 
Capital accumulation, in the private sector capital per worker grew 
at a rate of 2.4 percent per year between 1959-73, while 
productivity grew at a rate of 2.8 percent; during 1973-89, by 
contrast, these annual rates of growth were 0.8 percent and 0.9 
percent, respectively. 2) Technological change, which is difficult 
to measure except by reference to productivity. And 3) the quality 
of the labor force, including higher levels of schooling, higher 
quality and relevance of instruction. The conclusion derived is 
that "a major suspect in the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth 
is thus to be found not in the labor markets but in the capital 
markets."
The chapter on the role of government in the level and 
distribution of income, focuses on the effects of taxes and 
transfers and disclaims that the rich got richer while the poor got 
poorer. Between 1967 and 1990, money income grew faster in the 
higher quintile, at a rate of 35 percent, by contrast to 25 percent 
in the lowest quintile and 17 percent in the middle quir^ile. 
However, since this does not include noncash transfers, between 
1967-90 for the households in the lowest quintile, money income 
plus the estimated value of noncash transfers, adjusted for 
inflation, increased by 48 percent.
The chapter on competitive forces and regulation reviews three 
cases of beneficial deregulation, in the natural gas industry, the 
generation of electric power and cable television. One of the 
principles suggested is that "any proposal to regulate the market 
should be tempered by an understanding that regulation may be as
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imperfect as the market it is trying to improve."
The chapter on international markets and prosperity focuses on 
the Uruguay Round, the negotiations for a North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA), Europe 92 and what is called "the revolution toward 
more market-oriented economies." This chapter summarizes known 
positions already adopted and presented in these ongoing 
negotiations.
Finally, the last chapter describes the sources of some 
commonly used statistics, warning that "decisionmakers must be 
careful, first, to choose the most appropriate data to analyze 
issues and, second, to recognize the shortcomings of the measures 
they use."
II. 3. NO NEW RIVALS
(WDW/9/92 18 MARCH 1992)
"An official" has provided to The New York Times a copy of a 
46-page document, known in the Pentagon as the "Defense Planning 
Guidance," prepared every two years to serve as the basis for the 
design of strategy and budgets in forthcoming fiscal years, in this 
case for 1994-1999. It is the first of such documents "produced 
after the end of the cold war" and although still in "its final 
drafting stage," it was made available to The Times because the 
provider "believes this post-cold-war strategy debate should be 
carried out in the public domain." So much for the justification of 
this ubiquitous Washingtonian institution, better known as "the 
leak."
The document "addresses the fundamentally new situation which 
has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and 
the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global 
pretensions and influence." Other events that have shaped this new 
environment are the victory over Iraq, characterized as "the first 
post-cold-war conflict and a defining event in U.S. global 
leadership;" as well as another "less visible" victory, defined as 
"the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of 
collective security and the creation of a democratic 'zone of 
peace•."
Two basic assumptions underlie the proposed strategy. First, 
"it is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and 
Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for 
many years to come." Consequently, "with the demise of a global 
military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats, 
including possible conflicts arising from the territory of the
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former Soviet Union, will be of primary concern for the U.S. in the 
future." In these cases, "the U.S. will be concerned with 
preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power."
The proposed strategy is aimed at two objectives. First, "to 
prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of 
the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the 
order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union."
Three additional aspects are necessary to pursue this 
objective: 1) "the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to
establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of 
convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a 
greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their 
legitimate interests;" 2) to "account sufficiently for the 
interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them 
from challenging [U.S.] leadership or seeking to overturn the 
established political and economic order;" 3) to "maintain the 
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring 
to a larger regional or global role."
The second objective is to "address sources of regional 
conflict and instability... in regions of security importance for 
the United States because of their proximity (such as Latin 
America), or where we have treaty obligations or security 
commitments."
Several examples of the different "types of U.S. interests" 
are presented, such as "access to vital raw materials, primarily 
Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or 
regional local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics 
trafficking."
The document describes by region the way in which the strategy 
of "precluding the emergence of any potential future global 
competitor" will be applied.
In the former Soviet Union, "the best means of assuring that 
no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources 
within the former Soviet Union is to support its successor states 
(especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become 
peaceful democracies with market-based economies." Furthermore, 
"key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other 
republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military 
industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of 
Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain 
firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage 
of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries."
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In Western Europe, "to prevent the emergence of European-only 
security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the 
alliance's integrated command structure."
To grant to the east-central European states, "security 
commitments analogous to those... extended to Persian Gulf states."
In the Pacific rim, "acting as a balancing force and prevent 
emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon."
In the Middle East, "to remain the predominant outside power 
in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's 
oil," as well as "to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from 
dominating the region."
In the Indian subcontinent, to "discourage Indian hegemonic 
aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian 
Ocean."
Finally, in Latin America "Cuba's tenuous internal situation 
is likely to generate new challenges."
The reactions to the publication of this document did not make 
themselves wait, they will be described in next week's Dispatch.
II. 4. THE DEBATE ON THE LONE SUPERPOWER PLAN 
(WDW/10/92 25 March 1992)
The reactions generated to the publication, in the Sunday New 
York Times. 8 March 1992, of a draft of the Pentagon's "Defense 
Planning Guidance" for 1994-1999 (WDW/9/92) revealed the existence 
of an intense debate, within and with the Administration, about the 
role of the United States in the post-Cold War world. In an 
election year, a leak of such magnitude and the reactions have to 
be seen primarily as part and parcel of the political campaign.
First of all, among some of the presidential hopefuls there 
was a remarkable coincidence between conservatives and liberals in 
criticizing the document. On one side, Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan 
told reporters, "this is a formula for endless American 
intervention in quarrels and war when no vital interest of the 
United States is remotely engaged...It's virtually a blank check 
given to all of America's friends and allies that we'll go to war 
to defend their interests." Governor Bill Clinton's team, through 
his deputy campaign manager, dismissed the document as "one more 
attempt" by defense officials "to find an excuse for big budgets 
instead of downsizing."
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In Congress, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) called the 
document "myopic, shallow and disappointing." Senator Joseph Biden 
(D-Del.) said he agreed with some of the objectives, such as the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but he also said "the 
Pentagon vision reverts to an old notion of the United States as 
the world's policeman— a notion that, not incidentally, will 
preserve a large defense budget." More forcefully, Senator Alan 
Cranston (D-Calif.), in a speech in the Senate floor, accused the 
Defense Department of wanting to make the United States "the one, 
the only main honcho on the world block, the global Big Enchilada."
Some of these same arguments were used in an editorial in The 
New York Times, saying that "the go-it alone proposition is silly, 
the consequence of straining to justify extravagant military 
spending." Moreover, the document's propositions are described as 
"driven by the need to justify bloated budgets. But it's foolish, 
if only for financial reasons, to crow about America as solo 
superpower."
Even the Secretary General of the United Nations joined the 
critics, in an interview with Stephen Rosenfeld in The Washington 
Post, he said "if the Pentagon's recently revealed thoughts about 
American global hegemony prevail in policy," for Mr. Boutros-Ghali, 
this would mean "the end of the U.N."
Finally, an "Administration official, familiar with the 
reaction of senior officials at the White House and state 
Department, characterized the document as a 'dumb report'."
So much for the critics. President Bush, admitting that he had 
not read the document, urged the press not to "put too much 
emphasis on leaked reports." Even so, the President was seen as 
"broadly supportive of the thrust of the Pentagon document," when 
he said, "I think the United States has a burden to bear. But we 
have worked effectively through multilateral organizations. The 
clearest example of this is what happened in the gulf war...But we 
are leaders and we must continue to lead, we must continue to stay 
engaged. So it isn't a clear-cut choice of either-or."
Enthusiastically in favor was the columnist Charles 
Krauthammer, the best known theoretician of the unipolar moment, 
who saw it as "an impressive blueprint for the new world order." 
Enumerating the document's critics, he concluded, "with enemies 
like these, one can assume that the Pentagon Paper is doing 
something right." Krauthammer describes the alternative as 
"Japanese carriers patrolling the Strait of Malacca and a nuclear 
Germany dominating Europe" and asks, using a metaphor coined during 
the Cold War, "do we really want to devote the next 40 years to 
competition with two, three, many" nuclear superpowers? Finally, 
Krauthammer dismisses "collective internationalism" as a "dangerous 
nonsense," which is "not Utopian. It is merely stupid."
2 2
Supportive, as well, was The Wall Street Journal, in an 
editorial asking "what can you conclude about a document criticized 
by the likes of both Republican Pat Buchanan and Delaware Democrat 
Joe Biden? It must say something sensible." Also, in The Washington 
Post. retired army Colonel and columnist Harry Summers quoted a 
comment by Rome's II Manifesto, saying that "entrusting its dream 
to the armed legions, brings to our minds...the fall of the Roman 
Empire." Colonel Summers concluded, "that fall took some 296 years, 
80 years longer than the United States has been in existence. If 
the Pax Americana could last only a portion of that time, the world 
would be well served indeed."
Finally, by the end of the week, Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney counterattacked, in an op-ed in The New York Times titled 
"Active Leadership? You Better Believe It." Secretary Cheney sees 
in the criticism to the Pentagon plan, "the tired old cry that 
America's world presence is somehow immoral and dangerous." He 
depicts the alternatives as "either sustain the forces we require 
and remain in a position to help shape things for the better, or we 
can throw our advantage away." Although, he warns, "that would only 
hasten the day when we face greater threats at higher costs and 
further risk to American lives," just when the United States "can 
remain a leader for much less than it cost us in the past."
Secretary Cheney closes saying "those who advocate abandoning 
our leadership responsibilities are uncomfortable with our 
strength. But millions around the world have found it cause for 
celebration and pride."
II. 5. THE DEBATE ON U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY 
(WDW/20/92 8 JULY 1992)
In an election year, particularly in the middle of a 
recession, any attempt to describe the different positions that 
exist about economic policy is bound to be politically tainted, 
beyond what is usually accepted as normal. Even so, the timing to 
review the debate may me just right, since the proposals offered by 
the different contenders have not yet become part of their campaign 
platforms. Consequently, the search for the most politically 
attractive economic message is still under way.
This is the context in which recently took place the 
presentation by the former head of the Council of Economic Advisers 
during the Carter Administration, Charles L. Schultze, of a book 
titled Memos to the President, which contains 29 memos addressed to 
the future president. The memos are written in language accessible 
to the non-economist and propose what is described by the author as 
"a mainstream and centrist point of view." Furthermore, to
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illustrate the centrist nature of the proposals, the author was 
accompanied at the press conference where the book was presented by 
Professor James Tobin from Yale University and by Herbert Stein of 
the American Enterprise Institute.
In what is characterized as the mainstream, Schultze includes 
the moderately conservatives (such as Herbert Stein and Alan 
Greenspan) and the moderately liberals (such as Walter Heller and 
James Tobin), arguing that their differences concerning "the 
relative dangers of inflation and unemployment” have narrowed. The 
difference, in Schulze's terms, was that "moderate conservatives 
were umaally rather slow to recommend expansionary policies to 
fight a recession but quick to urge restrictive policies to prevent 
inflation." By contrast, the moderately liberals were more 
expansionist, more willing to rely on "incomes policies" to 
stimulate the economy "without increasing inflation." According to 
Herbert Stein, there has been a shift in emphasis from "managing 
demand to keep the economy at full employment," to issues such as 
"how to increase long-term growth," as well as "the importance of 
controlling the money supply to keep a lid on inflation."
Today, amidst high interest rates and structural budget 
deficits, these differences have narrowed. There is consensus at 
the center of the spectrum about the reliance on monetary policy as 
"the principal stabilization tool." Even so, some differences 
persist among the moderate conservatives about the role of tax cuts 
to increase private saving and investment.
Beyond stabilization policies, in the long run, the centrist 
prescription emphasizes "three macroeconomic contributors to the 
growth of supply." First, to increase national saving and 
investment by reducing the federal budget deficit, through tax 
increases and cutting spending in defense and in entitlement 
programs; second, to improve the quality of education, although not 
by spending money alone; and third, to expand the support for 
civilian research through the improvement of funding allocations.
On the right of the spectrum Schultze places the old and the 
new monetarism, both based on an outright "pessimism about the 
ability of the government to carry out a countercyclical policy."
Within the monetarist camp, the "supply-siders" hold that 
"short term fluctuations in GNP arise principally from sporadic 
changes in aggregate supply," consequently, efforts to stimulate 
demand by fiscal and monetary means will be inflationary.
In a similar vein, the rational expectations school holds a 
hands-off approach to stabilization policy, whereby stable monetary 
and fiscal policies reduce uncertainty so that prices and wages are 
allowed to adjust demand and supply.
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On the other side of the spectrum, appears what Schultze calls 
the "democratic left," constituted by three schools. First, those 
who hold that the federal budget deficit is overstated; second,
those who recommend a large increase in public investment, even at
the expense of the fiscal deficit; and third, those who recommend 
the adoption of an "industrial policy."
Professor Robert Eisner of Northwestern University is against 
centering economic policy around the budget deficit, for three
reasons: first, the deficit should be adjusted downward to account
for the effect of inflation on the government's debt; second, sharp 
reductions in the deficit should be avoided because these would 
depress aggregate demand and employment beyond the capability of an 
easier monetary policy; finally, unemployment is too high, which 
argues against increasing taxes or cutting expenditures.
Those who are in favor of a large increase in public 
investment identify infrastructure, highways, bridges and airports, 
as well as education, as the main recipients of expenditure 
increases. The underlying assumption is that a dollar spent in 
public infrastructure yields a higher payoff than private 
investment.
Finally, "liberal commentators and a few economists" are in 
favor of the adoption of an "industrial policy." They want the 
federal government to identify "strategic" industries, to stimulate 
them through protection against foreign competition, export 
subsidies and support for research and development. The key point 
is to entrust the government with the highly controverted task of 
"picking winners and losers."
More sooner than later, some of these proposals will certainly 
find their way into the platforms of the different presidential 
contenders. At this point, the question still unanswered is which 
ones are the winning propositions.
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III. THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
III. 1. THE ECONOMY AND THE ELECTION 
(WDW/22/92 22 JULY 1992)
Now that it has been confirmed that the November presidential 
election will be a race between two contenders, it is time to 
observe the state of the economy, particularly as it may influence 
the coming contest. After all, there is agreement that economic 
issues will be at the top of the voters concerns, given the present 
state of sluggish recovery that the economy is exhibiting.
In the terms of Seymour Lipset, the state of the economy still 
is the most accurate predictor of electoral behavior. As reported 
in The New York Times. Professor Allan J. Lichtman of American 
University, in his book The 13 Keys to the Presidency, has found 
that every time the economy has been in recession, since the Civil 
War, the opposition has won the Presidential election. Of the seven 
cases mentioned, the most recent are F.D. Roosevelt (32) ; J.F. 
Kennedy (60); and Ronald Reagan (80).
In the same sense, Professor Michael S. Lewis-Beck of the 
University of Iowa has found that a falling unemployment rate 
during the second quarter of an election year coincides with 
victory by the incumbent party, as with Truman (48) ; Johnson (64); 
Nixon (72); Reagan (84) and Bush (88). By contrast, a rising or 
flat unemployment rate during the second quarter of election years 
coincides with defeat for the incumbent in five out of six 
elections, as with the victories of Eisenhower (52) ; Kennedy (60); 
Nixon (68); Carter (76) and Reagan (80). The sole exception was 
Eisenhower's reelection (56).
Also, an analysis of the rate of growth of the gross national 
product (GNP) in postwar election years reveals that an average 
growth rate of 4.6 percent prevailed when the incumbent party was 
reelected, while an average rate of 2.98 percent prevailed when the 
incumbent was defeated.
For these reasons, several figures recently released do not 
augur well for the Administration and have made the chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Michael Boskin, say he was 
"very concerned."
First, on July 3, the Labor Department reported that the 
unemployment figure for June had increased by three tenths of a 
percentage point, to 7.8 percent. More worrisome still was the fact
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that among some of the hardest hit appear those states that 
contribute the largest numbers of electoral votes. For instance, 
California posted the highest jobless rate, growing from 8.7 
percent in May to 9.5 percent in June. New York, with 9.2 percent 
unemployed in June, registered the biggest increase of 1.3 percent, 
while in New Jersey the percentage of jobless reached also 9.2 
percent in the same month.
The immediate response by the Federal Reserve came the next 
day, in the form of a cut of half a point in the discount rate, to 
3 percent. This was the twenty fourth reduction in interest rates 
approved by the FED since mid-1989, which has brought short-term 
interest rates to their lowest levels in three decades. Even so, on 
July 16, the Federal Reserve disclosed that the growth of the money 
supply, as revealed by M2 which includes currency, checking 
deposits and certificates of deposit under $100,000, was only of 
1.5 percent, well below the target of 2.5 to 6.5 percent.
Finally, the rate of growth of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) for the first quarter of this year was 2.7 percent, the 
strongest quarter of the last three years. However, as in the 
summer of last year, several indicators by the end of May began 
revealing a turn for the worst, raising fears that the recovery 
might be faltering again.
Besides a discussion about the actions that could be adopted 
in response, the bad news immediately generated a serious split, 
among the Administration's economic team, concerning the way the 
outlook for the economy should be presented to the public.
As depicted by The New York Times, on one side appear the 
White House Chief of Staff Samuel Skinner and Treasury Secretary 
Nicholas Brady holding that "as a rule the President should talk 
favorably about economic prospects to build public confidence as 
the election approaches."
On the other side appear Vice-President Dan Quayle and CEA 
Chairman Michael Boskin holding that "the President should not seem 
optimistic lest voters see him as unsympathetic and out of touch 
with their economic troubles." Their concern is that the President 
will "look remote and uninformed if he is upbeat in his public 
statements."
Concerning the actions that could be taken, the Vice-President 
and the CEA Chairman are in favor of "pressing Congress hard for 
what President Bush calls his 'growth package'— primarily tax 
breaks to increase investment and stimulate construction and real 
state."
By contrast, Secretary Brady and Chief of Staff Skinner 
"believe the President would lose such a fight with the Democratic
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Congress and should not risk a confrontation.”
The difficulty is that some observers believe that not much 
time is left before the perceptions of the voters become fixed. The 
common wisdom i  s that voters begin to focus seriously on the 
election until the fall. However, at least one experienced 
commentator disagrees. The chief domestic political adviser to 
President Carter, Stuart Eizenstat, says that "voters lock into the 
economy, not on Election Day but the summer before. And unless 
something really dramatic happens, unless there's a really big 
change in circumstances, their perceptions don't change."
III. 2. CLINTONOMICS
(WDW/23/92 29 JULY 1992)
The most quoted statement on economic policy that came out of 
the Democratic Party convention, held last week in New York, was 
made by former congresswoman Barbara Jordan when she described the 
shift "from a party with a reputation of tax and spend to one of 
investment and growth."
As stated in the 22-page "National Economic Strategy," aimed 
at Putting People First and presented last June by Governor 
Clinton, "the most important family policy, urban policy, labor 
policy, minority policy and foreign policy America can have, is an 
expanding entrepreneurial economy of high-skill, high-wage jobs."
The centerpiece of this strategy is public investment, wrote 
in The New York Times Harvard Professor Robert Reich, one of the 
best known members of Governor Clinton's economic brain-trust. The 
first element of the proposal is $219.5 billion in new public 
investment, to be spent over the next four years. One half of this 
sum will be "invested in people," in education, training and 
scientific research. The other half would be used to establish a 
"Rebuild America Fund," to finance infrastructure projects, such as 
connecting major cities by high-speed rail, control toxic wastes, 
develop clean and efficient energy sources, link every home and 
classroom to a national information network and upgrade urban 
transportation, water and sewage systems.
This emphasis in public expenditure immediately leads to the 
issue of the federal budget deficit. In this regard, the proposal 
aims at more than offsetting the new spending programs by means of 
$294.7 billion in budgetary savings and new revenue, which would 
result in a net reduction of government spending over the next four 
years.
28
The Clinton proposal is also in line with the projections made 
by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the sense that, even 
under the assumption of no change in policy, the budget deficit 
will be cut in half by 1996, to $193 billion. However, without an 
increase in economic growth, the director of economic policy for 
the Clinton campaign, Gene Sperling, conceded that their proposal 
would cut the deficit only by $8 billion, although it would allow 
for granting a tax cut for the middle class of about $17 billion by 
1996.
Consequently, the almost $295 billion in new spending proposed 
would have to come from other sources. First, in the terms of 
Professor Reich, "the investments in people would be financed 
largely by a tax increase on the top 2 percent of income earners," 
expected to yield $92 billion over the next four years. This would 
increase to 37 percent the tax rate for couples earning more than 
$200,000, from the present ceiling of 28 percent resulting from the 
bipartisan congressional agreement of 1986. Second, one third of 
the infrastructure investments would be financed from outlay 
reductions, such as defense cuts amounting to $43 billion. Third, 
$58 billion would come from closing tax loopholes, particularly 
those enjoyed by foreign corporations. Finally, "administrative 
savings" amounting to $8.5 billion, such as eliminating 100,000 
workers from the federal payroll, which are equivalent to the cuts 
in the federal bureaucracy accomplished by the Eisenhower 
Administration after the Korean War.
Another central aspect of the proposal is the support it 
grants to what Hobart Rowen in The Washington Post called an 
"industrial policy with another name," by means of the promotion by 
the government of key technologies and industries. The main 
components of this policy are the creation of a new civilian 
research and development agency, as well as tax credits to 
encourage investment in new plants and long-term investments.
This also leads to the pressing issue of free trade, 
particularly to the position that will be adopted regarding the 
imminent subscription of the agreement creating a North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Until now, Governor Clinton's position has 
been described in The New York Times as seeking "to buy time," 
saying that "he believes in free trade in principle while 
withholding judgment on the pact with Mexico until he sees the 
details— particularly the ones involving labor standards and 
environmental protection."
Finally, the appointment of Senator Albert Gore as running 
mate can be interpreted as a signal about the priority that will be 
granted to environmental issues. Senator Gore is the author of the 
best seller Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1992). In this book appears the statement, 
Senator Gore used in the speech accepting the nomination as Vice-
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Presidential candidate, urging that "we must make the rescue of the 
environment the central organizing principle for civilization."
All these propositions are now submitted to the intense debate 
and scrutiny of the political campaign. On one side, Harvard 
professor Martin Feldstein wrote, in The Wall Street Journal, "the 
proposal flunks the budget test," because it "ignores the deficit 
in order to finance new government spending and a reduction in 
middle class taxes." On the other side, six winners of the Nobel 
prize in economics have praised the plan: professors Kenneth Arrow, 
Stanford; Lawrence Klein, Pennsylvania; James Tobin, Yale; and 
Franco Modigliani, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow, MIT.
In the words of professor Samuelson, "Clinton's economic 
program makes prudent sense, America most needs capital formation—  
human and material capital, private and public capital."
III. 3. THE ELECTION OF GOVERNOR CLINTON 
(WDW/33/92 11 NOVEMBER 1992)
It is well known that th^re is a predilection for interpreting 
the history of the United Si es in terms of cycles or instance, 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. hold, that U.S. domestic po, ..ical history 
has an "inherent rhythm," defined as "an alternation between 
liberalism and conservatism at about 30-year intervals." Others, 
in foreign policy, have found alternations between idealism and 
realism, or between extroverted internationalism and introverted 
isolationism.
It is to Schlesinger's credit that in his book The Cycles of 
American Historv. published in 1986, he predicted that "at some 
point, shortly before or after the year 1990, there should come a 
sharp change in the national mood and direction." And change came 
in the form of Governor Clinton's victory, accurately characterized 
by Schlesinger as the turn towards a liberal phase of the cycle, 
"with its commitment to public action, idealism and reform."
Schlesinger also foresaw that "it is the generational 
experience that serves as the mainspring of the political cycle." 
Accurate again, President-elect Clinton and Vice-President Gore 
both were born after the Second World War, they are the first 
presidential ticket to be elected from the so-called "baby boom 
generation." Moreover, in Schlesinger's terms, "people tend to be 
formed politically by the ideals dominant in the years they attain 
political consciousness, say between 16 and 25." Hence, the 
victorious candidate's identification with President Kennedy, as 
well as with the 1960 election, "when a 43-year-old Democrat 
replaced a 70-year-old Republican incumbent," reminded David Broder
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in The Washington Post. Additionally, there is the decisive role 
played in the political formation of the President-elect by the 
Vietnam War.
Finally, Schlesinger finds no coincidence between these 
domestic, thirty-year generational cycles of "alternation between 
public purpose and private interest" and the "cyclical rhythm" that 
allegedly exists as well in foreign policy, or the alternations 
between "extroversion" and "introversion." Once again this is quite 
accurate, because by contrast with some previous experience, such 
as the elections of John F. Kennedy or Franklin D. Roosevelt, this 
time the turn towards activism in domestic policy coincides with a 
turn towards introversion.
There are several indications coming out of the campaign, as 
well as from the transition team, that domestic economic issues 
will be the dominant priority of the incoming Administration, with 
international affairs occupying at best a secondary position in the 
new agenda.
First of all, to quote the now famous slogan which inspired 
the handlers of the Clinton campaign, "it's the economy, stupid." 
There is consensus that the economy was the most salient issue of 
the election and the one that more voters cited as their dominant 
concern. Additionally, as confirmation of the turn towards 
introversion, by contrast, only 8 percent of the voters cited 
foreign policy as their main concern, and most of them voted for 
President Bush. However, it was not only the economy in itself 
which dominated the campaign and the election, but how much 
government action is required to keep the economy in motion at 
acceptable rates.
Second, as announced by the heads of the transition team, one 
of the first activities will be to convene in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, a group of business leaders and economists to have a 
conversation "about priorities," declared the well-connected 
Washington lawyer, Vernon E. Jordan, chairman of the transition 
commission. Also, after the inauguration, one of the first measures 
will be the creation of an economic security council. Modeled after 
the National Security Council (NSC), the new economic council will 
be headed as well by an assistant to the President for economic 
affairs, to coordinate the functioning of all the cabinet 
departments that handle economic affairs. One of the names most 
frequently heard to occupy this position is Harvard Professor 
Robert Reich, well known for his advocacy of industrial policy and 
its complement, managed trade. It has also been suggested, as an 
indication of the priority given to domestic economic affairs, that 
the position of Secretary of the Treasury will be filled before the 
appointment of Secretary of State, traditionally the first 
appointment made by an incoming President.
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Finally, during the campaign, several international economic 
issues, such as trade, investment and economic assistance, were 
addressed in ways which reveal the ancillary role assigned to them, 
as instruments for the accomplishment of what are seen as 
relatively more urgent domestic economic priorities.
In these terms, Schlesinger is once again accurate in 
predicting that the domestically active phases of the cycles of 
U.S. politics do not necessarily coincide with an outward looking 
and active phase in foreign policy. Thus, this time, the United 
States will turn inward to carry out the process of healing its 
domestic economy. Be it as :t may, amidst the sluggishness which 
presently prevails in the .nternational economy, the reactivation 
of the U.S. economy, more than anything else, will make a more 
decisive contribution to the prosperity of the world economy. 
Consequently, never mind if such reactivation demands for a while 
a period of introversion, whereby international economic issues 
will perhaps be submitted to what Hirschman, quoting Burke, called 
"a wise and salutary neglect."
III. 4. PRESIDENT-ELECT CLINTON•S ECONOMIC TEAM FOR THE 
TRANSITION (WDW/35/92 25 NOVEMBER 1992)
It is fascinating to witness, as the transition progresses, 
how the battles over principles or over ideas are rapidly becoming 
battles over persons. As anticipated by the campaign promise of 
prioritizing the economy, the members of President-elect Clinton's 
economic team have already been designated to manage the
transition. Immediately, the release of the names has unleashed an 
outburst of comments and leaks, evidence of the intense power 
struggles that are taking place behind the scenes. After all, the 
transformation of principles or promises into policies has to be 
mediated by power, which ultimately crystallizes in those who are 
responsible of wielding it.
One of the first names released was that of Harvard Kennedy 
School Professor Robert Reich, to head the economics transition 
team. He is well known for his book The Work of Nations, where he 
advocates some of the policies of governmental activism which
allegedly have been among the ongoing topics of discussion with the 
President-elect, since they both were first Rhodes Scholars at 
Oxford and then classmates at Yale Law School.
To assist Professor Reich in the preparation of concrete
proposals on different issues other names were released, and all of 
them are already seen as well positioned to occupy decisive posts 
in the new Administration.
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Among them, Harvard Professor of economics Lawrence Summers, 
former advisor to Governor Dukakis and since Thursday on leave from 
the post of World Bank's Chief Economist, is in charge of economic 
policy. Berkeley Professor of economics and business administration 
Laura D'Andrea Tyson will deal with technology and manufacturing, 
her most recent book is "Who's Bashing Whom; Trade Conflict in 
High-Technology Industries." Business consultant Ira Magaziner, 
also a Rhodes Scholar, will deal with budget cuts, while budget 
consultant Letitia Chambers will deal with the overall budgetary 
process. Georgetown Law School Professor Barry Carter will deal 
with trade and Occidental College Professor of urban studies Derek 
Shearer will deal with education for competitiveness. Finally, to 
assist Professor Summers on economic policy have been appointed 
Robert Shapiro, from the Progressive Policy Institute, Robert 
Rubin, co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, and Roger Altman, a classmate 
of the President-elect at Georgetown University who is a partner of 
the Blackstone Group, a New York investment bank.
Some names which do not appear in the transition team are also 
mentioned for high level positions, such as former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker, Alice Rivlin from the Brookings Institution, 
MIT Professor Paul Krugman and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.).
However, the primary focus is on Professor Reich, described in 
The New York Times as a "noneconomist" and "the only economic 
adviser with daily access to Mr. Clinton," as well as the 
President-elect's "chief thinker on economics."
Mr. Reich's work is said to have been criticized "by trained 
economists, mostly on the ground that he is a lawyer, not a Ph.D. 
in economics." Furthermore, such criticism is presented as the 
explanation of why "Mr. Reich, who is on leave from Harvard, has 
failed to get a tenured professorship at the Kennedy School."
The Times admits that "the criticism of Mr. Reich's 
credentials in economics has intensified with his appointment last 
week as chief of the economics transition team." An allegation Mr. 
Reich "has countered by declaring that he is seeking advice from 
numerous trained economists and is relying in particular on 
Lawrence Summers."
The reaction to this last statement from Stanford Professor 
Robert Hall, characterized as "a spokesman for university 
economists," was that "Reich is an enigma to economists, and I am 
glad Larry Summers is there."
Under scrutiny by The Wall Street Journal is Professor Tyson, 
for holding that "subsidies to key export industries, selective 
trade retaliation against foreign countries and government 
negotiations to achieve an increased share of foreign markets— so- 
called managed trade— can all improve economic well-being." Also,
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Professor Tyson "carefully distinguishes between good trade 
activism and bad trade activism; but she doesn't provide much 
guidance on how to get government to do the same." However, 
concludes THE JOURNAL, "the real challenge for Mr. Clinton is to 
make Washington work the way his advisers want," because "decisions 
in this city aren't based on her (Professor Tyson's) principles; 
they are based on power."
Finally, according to The Washington Post "the snub to 
economists" came from the fact that "Candidate Clinton's inner 
circle of young economic advisers included two lawyers, a business 
consultant, a professor of urban planning, two investment bankers, 
a speech-writing policy analyst, two journalists and the vice- 
president of a Washington think tank— but no certified economists." 
The Post explains "the ascendancy of...these baby boomers" as "a 
generational shift that will expand the economic debate to ground- 
level micro-economic concerns, such as training, technological 
innovation and improved management techniques, from all- 
encompassing macroeconomic issues, such as money supply and 
currency values."
In the terms of MIT Professor Paul Krugman, 39, "for people in 
their fifties, the cutting edge of economics was to show how 
markets were perfect... for people in their thirties the cutting- 
edge work is now in showing how markets are imperfect."
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VI. THE BURST OF THE BUBBLE
VI. 1. JAPAN IN RECESSION
(WDW/30/92 21 OCTOBER 1992)
Hard to believe, as it is, the Japanese economy has fallen 
into a slump, which according to some analysts is not only 
different from previous recessions but also is having some profound 
internal and external consequences. Even so, several key indicators 
reveal also that this recession is not so different from previous 
downturns, which gives ground to a certain degree of optimism. Once 
again, it is hoped, the Japanese economy will pull out at a rate of 
5 percent in GDP growth, as it did in the mid-eighties to overcome 
the slump caused by the appreciation of the yen.
On a yearly basis, manufacturing and mining decreased 4.2 
percent, while housing starts dropped 7 percent and corporate 
earnings fell 16.1 percent during fiscal year 1991 and are expected 
to decline 6.4 percent during this year. Still, other fundamental 
indicators give ground to the hope that the recession will be 
shallow. After all, this is Japan and even in the middle of a 
recession there is a labor shortage and little excess capacity in 
the manufacturing sector. The housing market is also experiencing 
a revival, with sales of existing condominiums rising modestly, 
after three years of decline.
Furthermore, the government is not idly waiting for the 
turnaround. Contrary to what is happening in other industrialized 
countries, Japan is the only member of the Group of Seven (G-7) 
with a budget surplus. By the end of last August, the government 
approved the largest reactivation package in the nation's history, 
amounting to $86 billion, more than doubling spending in public 
works and to strengthen the financial system by supporting the 
stock and real state markets. Thus, "the Ministry of Finance and 
other Government agencies have finally accepted the view that the 
Japanese economy is very weak," declared to The New York Times. Mr. 
Yoshihisa Kitai, an economist with the Long Term credit Bank of 
Japan.
The unprecedented magnitude of this reactivation package, 
amounting to 2.3 percent of GNP, is better understood as a response 
to some of the extraordinary features exhibited by the present 
recession. First of all, now it is recognized that the government 
was too harsh in its stepping on the brakes. After two successive 
years of 5 percent growth in the mid-eighties, it appears that the
35
soft landing engineered with the purpose of bursting the 
speculative bubble in land and stocks, which was leading to a 
severe labor shortage, went a bit too far.
For instance, when the reactivation package was announced, the 
Nikkei stock index was close to crossing the key mark of 15,000 and 
there was speculation of a plunge into the 12,000 mark. As 
expected, the stock market reacted, reaching around 18,000 by mid- 
September and it was projected to regain the March 1992 level of 
above 19,000, but several analysts cautioned that such outcome 
depends on continued government support.
Additionally, lowering astronomical land prices, which were 
feeding the speculative bubble by remaining at more than eighty 
times above those of New York City, has been momentarily set aside. 
At least $6.4 billion of the reactivation package are earmarked for 
housing assistance, as well as $12.4 billion to buy land for future 
public projects. Moreover, the bulk of the package, $31.4 billion 
for public works, includes at least fifty percent dedicated to land 
purchases.
Such stimulus to the real estate market will certainly help 
the ailing banks, promised tax breaks to write off bad loans and 
the creation, by the end of the year, of a quasi-public company to 
buy up some of the bad loans and the inflated real estate held by 
the banks. To appreciate what this means, suffice it to say that 
the cost of the rescue of the savings and loans in the United 
States pales when contrasted with the preliminary estimates of what 
is required to set up this bailout company to salvage the Japanese 
banks. After all, the magnitude of the bailout corresponds to the 
fact that fifteen of the world's largest banks are Japan se.
Finally, the recession is testing the institution of lifetime 
employment in the private sector, since the labor shortage which 
has prevailed to sustain it seems to be evaporating. According to 
figures released by the Labor Ministry, by the end of August, there 
were still 104 jobs available for each 100 persons looking for 
work, but the same figure in August 1991 was 147 jobs available for 
every 100 persons looking for work. Also, add 800,000 persons 
classified as "in-house unemployed," meaning those who are employed 
but have little or no work, and the unemployment figure increases 
from a very low 2.2 percent to an unprecedented 3.5 percent.
The international implications of how the Japanese economy 
will finally pull out of this extraordinary slump can only be dimly 
anticipated. First, there is the possibility that some Japanese 
banks will try to repatriate some of their overseas assets. For 
instance, Japanese banks hold 12 percent of total commercial-bank 
assets in the United States and in California they hold nearly a 
quarter of all bank deposits.
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A sudden repatriation of some of these assets can destabilize 
stock markets and push even higher the value of the yen, which in 
September soared at around 120 to the dollar and brought Japan's 
embarrassing trade surplus to an all-time high of $12.1 billion, 
mainly because the recession is dampening import demand while 
exports remain unaffected. No wonder, the Bank of Japan's quarterly 
survey of business sentiment revealed that business confidence was 
at the lowest level of the last fifteen years.
VI. 2. THE BAILOUT OF JAPANESE BANKS 
(WDW/32/92 4 NOVEMBER 1992)
On October 30, the powerful bankers federation of Japan, 
headed by Tsuneo Waikai, President of the Mitsubishi Bank, unveiled 
a long-awaited plan to rescue the country's lending institutions. 
Thus continued the aftershocks caused by the bursting of the 
speculative bubble in land and stocks, which was feeding the 
unprecedented financial boom that placed fifteen Japanese banks 
among the world's largest (WDW/30/92).
To appreciate the magnitude of the problem, according to the 
Finance Ministry, as of September 30, the amount of non-performing 
loans — those on which no interest had been paid for the last six 
months—  in Japan's twenty-one largest banks reached 12.3 billion 
yen, or $100 billion, an increase of 54 percent from the $65 
billion registered in March. However, these figures were received 
with skepticism among some analysts, because they do not include 
other loans which are being supported artificially, either because 
the borrower made only one interest payment in six months or 
because interest rates had been reduced to avoid outright defaults.
If these other loans are included, the amount of non­
performing loans is estimated at 30 trillion yen, or about $244 
billion, while a few analysts place this figure at closer to 60 
trillion yen, or $492 billion. Additionally, almost half of the 
non-performing loans were estimated by Professor Yukio Noguchi of 
Hitotsubashi University, quoted in The New York Times, as "complete 
losses."
These figures make the rescue of the savings and loans 
institutions in the United States look paltry, since it is 
estimated that their bailout will cost the taxpayers around $200 
billion. However, Japanese officials denied that their rescue 
package would resemble the Resolution Trust Corporation of the 
United States, precisely because this last was created with 
taxpayers money.
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In Japan, the creation of a corporation to purchase non- 
performing loans is also envisaged, but it will be different 
because the initial $50 million in capital will come from the 
participating banks. The corporation will purchase the non­
performing loans with money borrowed from the bank selling the 
loan. Thus, if the value of the real estate held as collateral 
increases, the bank selling the loan will be entitled to any 
increase in the value. Also, since the loans will be sold at less 
than face value, the bank selling the loan will deduct the 
difference from its profits before taxes, in effect allowing them 
to save considerable amounts in taxes and granting them what was 
immediately characterized as "a huge benefit." Finally, if the 
collateral is sold at even lower prices than purchased, the bank 
selling the loan would have to pay the difference.
Most reactions to the proposal were skeptical. First, it was 
said to favor the strong banks rather than those smaller 
institutions which exhibit higher ratios of non-performing loans. 
Second, even with the tax advantages, there is the suspicion that 
the taxpayers will have to assume a heavier burden, particularly if 
the situation of the weaker banks is addressed. Finally, there is 
the issue of what is the real price of real estate assets in 
today's paralyzed market, where it is not a matter of "prices going 
up or down," according to a senior Finance Ministry official quoted 
in The New York Times, but "the problem is that people don't know 
the price."
However, beyond the details of how the bailout of the banks 
will take place, there are several other manifestations of the 
slump in which the Japanese economy has fallen that are already 
contributing to unprecedented exercises of "soul searching," 
unheard of before during any contemporary recession.
For instance, some of the reviled positions held by a group of 
Western scholars and commentators, baptized as "revisionists, are 
gaining ground in Japan. Led by Professor Chalmers Johnson from the 
University of California, as well as by journalists Karel van 
Wolf eren, author of The Enicrma of Japanese Power, and James 
Fallows, former correspondent of The Atlantic in Japan, the basic 
"revisionist" argument was that the Japanese version of capitalism 
was "different." Consequently, it could not be treated in the same 
manner as the relations with other capitalist countries.
Some of these arguments were previously dismissed as "racist." 
But none other than Mr. Akio Morita, chairman of Sony and co-author 
of The Japan that Can Sav No. recently wrote an article warning 
that "European and American tolerance of Japanese practices is 
reaching its limits." Thus, he appealed to Japanese firms to 
increase dividends and wages, to reduce working hours, as well as 
to scale back their aggressive capital spending and foreign-market 
penetration. As baptized by Mr. Gaishi Hiraiwa, the chairman of the
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mighty business organization Keidanren, Japanese corporations will 
now practice "kyosei," understood as symbiosis or coexistence with 
adversaries. Also, an advisory panel to Prime Minister Miyazawa, 
chaired by Mr. Tadahiro Sekimoto, chairman of NEC, the 
telecommunications giant, has proposed to change the "keiretsu 
system," or the in-breeding among corporate giants believed to be 
responsible for the aggressive pursuit of market share at all cost.
Some skeptics dismiss "kyosei" as a "clever gimmick," or as a 
"smoke screen to make virtue out of necessity." Even so, others see 
in it an indication of the impact of the recession. In the terms of 
Mr. Yoh Kurosawa, chairman of the Industrial Bank of Japan, "the 
Japanese have learned a great deal from the collapse of the bubble 
economy... they have glimpsed into the abyss."
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V. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
V. 1. ENVIRONMENTALISTS VS. ECONOMISTS 
(WDW/6/92 26 FEBRUARY 1992)
On the verge of issuing this year's World Development Report, 
dedicated to the environment and development, there is evidence 
that an intense debate is under way within the World Bank, pitting 
environmentalists against economists. At issue is the conciliation 
of two rationalities, revealed through one of the least effective, 
though one of the most revealing weapons available in the arsenal 
of bureaucratic infighting.
Excerpts of an internal ¡.emorandum drafted, on December 12, by 
the Bank's Chief Economist, Lawrence Summers, were leaked and 
published in The Economist of February 8. As admitted by Mr. 
Summers, these excerpts previously achieved such "wide circulation 
within the Bank," that he fei it necessary to re-issue, on January 
14, the original memo contai. g, among others, comments on export 
performance, trade flows and regional groupings. Thf portion 
leaked to the press was dedicated to answering ti - question 
"shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the 
dirty industries to the LDCs?" To answer this question, Mr. Summers 
makes the following three points:
1) If the measurement of health impairing pollution is based 
on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality, 
the countries where health impairing pollution has the lowest cost 
are those with the lowest wages. Thus, concludes Mr. Summers, "the 
economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest 
wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that."
2) "Tie costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the 
initial increments of pollution probably have very low cost." 
Consequently, Mr. Summers concludes, "underpopulated countries in 
Africa are vastly under-polluted, their air quality is vastly 
inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City." 
Furthermore, "only the lamentable facts that so much pollution is 
generated by non-tradable industries (transport, electrical 
generation) and that the unit transport costs of solid waste are so 
high prevent world welfare enhancing trade in air pollution and 
waste. "
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3) Finally, "the demand for a clean environment for aesthetic 
and health reasons is likely to have very high income elasticity." 
Thus, "the concern over an agent that causes a one in a million 
change in the odds of prostrate cancer is obviously going to be 
much higher in a country where people survive to get prostrate 
cancer than in a country where under 5 mortality is 200 per 
thousand. Also, much of the concern over industrial atmospheric 
discharge is about visibility impairing particulates. These 
discharges may have very little direct impact. Clearly trade in 
goods that embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be welfare 
enhancing. While production is mobile the consumption of pretty air 
is a non-tradable."
To conclude, Mr. Summers recognizes that "the problem with the 
arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in LDCs 
(intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, 
lack of adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used 
more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for 
liberalization."
The press reacted immediately. The Economist first published 
portions of the memo under the headline "Let them eat pollution." 
Michael Prowse, in the column "On America" of The Financial Times 
said "Save Planet Earth from economists." The Secretary for the 
Environment of Brazil, quoted in O Estado de Sao Paulo, said it was 
"a scandal" and requested an explanation from the Bank. The 
Independent's headline was a quote, 'Send pollution to the Third 
World.' The Times of India said "the memo would be welcome by those 
who do not want economics to be polluted by social or humane 
considerations." Concluding that the memo "favors equity since it 
wants to abolish the islands of underdevelopment, which through 
this conspiracy have managed to keep their air clean."
The reactions in the press, as well as the fact that the memo 
was leaked probably to score points in an internal debate, indicate 
how far the issue is from forming part of a consensus between 
environmentalists and economists.
Finally, the President of the World Bank made a statement in 
one of the stops of a visit to Africa, that took him to Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa. Mr. Preston said, "the comments 
were taken out of a longer document... which was meant to be a 
provocative document... but that language is really outrageous and 
not acceptable taken outside the full content of the memorandum." 
Mr. Preston also said that "in life I think very bright people say 
some very foolish things and this is an example of that, and as far 
as I am concerned the incident is closed." Mr. Preston concluded 
saying "the Bank's position on the environment is set by the 
management and it's approved by our executive directors, and Mr. 
Summers supports that position."
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The incident may be closed but the debate is far from being 
so. Mr. Summers wrote to The Economist, on February 15, saying his 
memo "tried to sharpen the debate on important issues by taking as 
narrow-minded an economic perspective as possible." Another heavy­
weight, Columbia University Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, presently 
economic adviser to the Director General of GATT, wrote in The 
Financial Times, "no modern economist, when his house is on fire, 
will pull his father out before his mother because the father earns 
more than the mother!... Economists and environmentalists should 
join hands to create a shared success."
V. 2. THE EXTERNAL DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(WDW/2/92 29 JANUARY 1992)
In stark contrast with the decade of the eighties, this year's 
World Debt Tables, issued in two volumes by the World Bank at the 
end of last year, begin by recognizing that "on the whole, the debt 
burden of developing countries is not projected to show much change 
in 1991, despite an unfavorable external environment." Another way 
of saying that the issue has lost saliency, because "debt stocks 
are projected to be static and debt indicators to show only small 
changes from their 1990 levels."
According to the World Bank's Chief Economist, Lawrence H. 
Summers, "the debt problem muddled along in 1991 with progress in 
some areas but regress in others." Consequently, the debt issue has 
not vanished, since "underlying this aggregate picture are 
important differences across regions and country groups."
Here are some of the highlights contained in the first volume 
of Analysis and Summary Tables:
1) At the end of 1991, the total external debt of all
developing countries was projected to reach $1.35 trillion, 
unchanged from the $1.34 trillion it reached in 1990.
2) Aggregate debt stock indicators for developing countries in 
1991 are projected to be mixed, with 176 percent of debt-to-exports 
ratio, the same as in 1990, 38 percent of debt-to-GNP ratio, down 
from 42 percent in 1990, and the debt service-to-exports ratio 
higher at 21 percent, compared to 20 percent in 1990.
3) Total external debt owed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 1991 is projected to decrease to $429 billion, from $431 billion 
in 1990, or almost 37.4 percent of GNP, down from 41 percent in
1990, representing 268 percent of total exports of goods and
services, up from 261 percent in 1990, with the debt service-to- 
exports ratio rising "significantly to 30 percent from 25 percent
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in the preceding year."
4) Aggregate net resource flows are projected to rise in 
nominal terms to $84.9 billion, compared with $81.5 billion in 
1990, but to fall by 1 percent in real terms. The composition of 
these flows is expected to confirm recent trends, a continuing 
shift from bank to nonbank sources and from debt to equity flows, 
including foreign direct investment and portfolio flows. For 
instance, in 1991, the official share in net flows— development 
finance comprising official loans and grants— amounted to the same 
60 percent of 1990, up from one third in 1981; net commercial bank 
lending now accounts for only about 5 percent of net flows, 
compared with 40 percent a decade earlier; while private flows 
account now for only 10 percent, compared with about 50 percent a 
decade ago; finally, foreign direct investment accounts now for 
about 30 percent, compared with 13 percent ten years ago.
5) A continuation of non-debt flows to Latin America is 
projected, although net transfers— net resource flows less interest 
payments and profit remittances— are still projected to remain 
negative, rising from $6.3 billion in 1990 to $8.6 billion in 1991. 
This projection of net outflows from Latin America is based on the 
assumption of interest payments related to the clearance of 
arrears.
6) The aggregate picture is said to mask the problems faced by 
the severely indebted low-income countries (SILICs), which have 
experienced rising debt stocks and little or no improvement in debt 
ratios. Indebted largely to official creditors, exhibiting low per 
capita income and productivity, as well as afflicted by "structural 
weaknesses, including poorly diversified exports, low levels of 
education and health, and high rates of population growth,” the 
SILICs require "an expanded menu of debt relief options."
7) A few middle income countries, such as Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela, have been able to emerge from commercial bank debt 
reduction with renewed access to the international capital markets, 
through both debt and equity flows. Thus, the experience with the 
Brady Initiative reveals that "official finance within a voluntary 
market-based framework has helped support significant debt 
reduction leading to improved domestic investor confidence."
8) Eastern Europe has benefitted from growing official 
support, with net disbursements mainly from the World Bank and the 
IMF projected to rise, excluding Yugoslavia, to $8 billion in 1991, 
from $800 million in 1990. The former Soviet Union, admittedly 
based on estimates subject to considerable uncertainty, is "no more 
than severely indebted by international standards." In 1991, debt 
service on medium- and long-term debt would have amounted to 
between $10-14 billion, including $6 billion in interest payments; 
short-term bank credits would have been about $6-8 billion; and
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debt service to Paris Club creditors would have been about $5.7 
billion.
9) The Paris Club's extension of exceptional debt relief to 
Poland and Egypt is listed as an important positive development.
10) Finally, the concern about an "abrupt rationing of capital" 
is dismissed on the grounds that developing countries account for 
only about one-fifth of the global economy and less of net capital 
flows.
"In summary," concluded Mr. Summers' opening statement 
presenting the World Debt Tables, "the call of the G-7 Summit for 
greater debt relief for low-income countries, the Paris Club 
restructurings for Poland and Egypt, and the renewed access of 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela to private sources of finance, are 
encouraging signs that the debt problem can be resolved."
V. 3. DISSENT OF DEVELOPMENT
(WDW/5/92 19 FEBRUARY 1992)
Heralds of the so-called "Washington consensus" should be 
concerned because some profound fractures are becoming visible in 
one of its most solid strongholds.
Two debates about development issues at the World Bank have 
become public, revealing that the "consensus" is not as firm as 
some of its advocates would like to. One of these debates was 
generated by a report, in four volumes, preserved to the Board of 
Directors by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) on 
Industrialization in Newlv Industrializing Countries - Case 
Studies of Korea. India and Indonesia. The other, probably of more 
profound significance, is the dissenting opinion expressed by 
Japanese representatives about the Bank's approach to structural 
adjustment.
Probably the Bank's OED study on industrialization would have 
passed unnoticed, as many others have, except that this time the 
management came out openly against "a wide distribution of the 
report in its present form outside the Bank."
The study deals with the Bank's "approach to industrial 
strategy" in the three countries already mentioned, with the first 
of the four volumes presenting analysis, synthesis and 
recommendations, while the other three contain the case studies of 
the Republic of Korea, India, and Indonesia.
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It is impossible to summarize all the different issues raised 
in the study. Nonetheless, probably the management's reaction can 
be better understood if the following are considered. The Bank's 
approach to industrial policy is characterized in the report as 
'•moderate neoclassical," because it "accepts that factor and 
product markets are not fully efficient in developing countries and 
that there is a role for government interventions."
However, the Bank seems to prefer "functional" instead of 
"selective" interventions. Both are aimed at correcting market 
failures, with the first doing it generically, while the second 
supports specific activities over others. The Bank prefers to focus 
on "incentive factors" and to ignore structural factors, such as 
skills, technology and institutions. There is a strong tendency at 
the Bank to remedy failures in factor and product markets by 
maintaining neutrality among activities. Finally, "the Bank 
displays an ambiguous attitude to issues of industrial strategy," 
while it exhibits a propensity to emphasize the failures of 
intervention.
The response from the management contains the following 
points. First, the three case studies are too limited and Korea is 
"an outlier on the spectrum of developing countries." Second, not 
all the work done by the Bank on industrialization was taken fully 
into account. Third, insufficient attention is given to the 
regulatory environment and the financial system. Fourth, "the 
report gives too strong an endorsement to government intervention." 
Fifth, it "fails to comprehend the essence of government failure," 
particularly as intervention encourages "rent seeking behavior" 
among public officials and private agents. Finally, it "overstates 
the degree to which governments can develop subsector specific 
paths of industrial development," and it "calls for the impossible: 
fine tuning an array of trade and industrial interventions to deal 
with real or perceived market failures is generally not feasible."
So much for this confrontation, illustrative of the 
flourishing within the Bank of different viewpoints and of the 
existence of a healthy debate between them.
By contrast, the Japanese dissenting voice on the Bank's 
approach to structural adjustment is far more relevant, if only 
because it comes from "a major partner," or from one of the most 
important sources of cofinancing for structural adjustment loans.
The Japanese position is described in an occasional paper of 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), which instead of 
dealing with all the issues, simply mentions four points "that seem 
to have been overlooked by the Bank."
First, structural adjustments, including deregulation, will 
prove insufficient to generate sustainable growth; additional
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measures are required "aiming directly at promoting investment," 
similar to the Japanese fiscal and monetary policies applied in the 
post-war. Second, "trade liberalization based on static comparative 
advantage may have a negative impact on the possibility of economic 
development," consequently, deliberate "measures for fostering 
industry are required...protection for a certain period of time is 
indispensable." Third, it is also "indispensable to have 
development finance institutions lending with subsidized interest 
rates, under some circumstances, in order to maximize the social 
welfare." Fourth, privatization efforts have to take into 
consideration the different conditions that prevail in individual 
countries; "unfortunately, the World Bank's approach seems to be 
almost similar for every country." Also, "another problem is the 
idea that all the private sector is to be treated equally, whether 
it be indigenous or foreign. This may be ideal from the standpoint 
of efficiency." However, since developing countries have had "a 
bitter experience with colonialism... it is necessary to adopt 
factors other than efficiency as the criteria for decision making 
when considering privatization."
The paper closes reminding that there are trade-offs between 
efficiency and fairness and calls for a balanced policy between 
both, "to improve the welfare of the entire society." For all these 
reasons, the OECF concludes that "the World Bank's approach to 
structural adjustment may have to be changed."
V. 4. DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(WDW/11/9 21 APRIL 1992)
The debate between environmentalists and economists at the 
World Bank, revealed by a leaked memo from the Chief Economist 
(WDW/6/92) , seems to have been won, for the time being, by the 
economists. This is what indicates the approval by the Board of 
Directors of the Bank of the new World Development Report ( W D R )  
1992, to be released sometime in May, just in time for the Earth 
Summit.
The intensity of the debate, as well as the reasons for the 
leak, can now be better understood, because the WDR addresses some 
of the most sensitive points of the controversy and strives, with 
some degree of success, to strike a balance between these two 
rationalities.
First of all, as indicated by President Lewis Preston to the 
Bank's Board of Directors, this year's WDR constitutes the third 
leg of "a trilogy on the goals and means of development," together 
with the 1990 dedicated to poverty and last year's on development 
strategies. It is also a tribute to former President Barber
46
Conable, who sought, with the preparation of this trilogy, to 
signal the reorientation of the Bank towards a more pragmatic 
stance, loosening the grip of orthodoxy which prevailed during the 
first half of the eighties.
Evidence of this stance abounds throughout the Report. For 
instance, "the world has learned over the last two decades that 
markets can do more and governments should do less to promote 
development...But environmental protection is one area where 
government must maintain a central role. Private markets provide 
little or no incentive to curb pollution... there is a compelling 
case for public action."
The relationship between development and the environment, 
characterized as "a false dichotomy," is also explored 
pragmatically and it is anchored on development. The issue is 
described as "how environmental problems can and do undermine the 
goals of development," because the Report's "primary focus" is 
described as "the welfare of developing countries."
Two sets of policies are proposed "to attack the underlying 
causes of environmental damage." The first set seeks to identify 
the "positive (win-win) links between efficient income growth and 
the environment." Among these, "the most important...relates to 
poverty reduction: not only is attacking poverty a moral
imperative, it is also essential for environmental stewardship." 
Other positive sum links are found in correcting or preventing 
government failures and improving access to technology and 
resources. The second set of policies is necessary because "sound 
development policies are not enough to ensure environmental 
quality." Policies to change behavior are also necessary, "to 
induce or require resource users to take account of the spillover 
effects of their actions on the rest of society." Two broad types 
of these policies are identified: first, "market-based policies, 
which tax or charge polluters according to the amount of damage 
they do;" and second, those based on quantitative restrictions, or 
"command and control policies." A combination of both is the 
"tradable permit," which sets an absolute limit on damage and 
allows individuals to buy or sell the right to pollute, thus, the 
quantitative restriction applies to the group, while it provides 
flexibility to individuals.
This reveals a major shift in the environmental debate, "away 
from a concern over physical limits to growth toward a concern 
about incentives for human behavior and policies to overcome market 
and policy failures." In other terms, the emphasis has shifted from 
a general definition of sustainable development, as the one 
sponsored, for instance, by the Bruntland Commission, toward a 
narrower definition based on "tradeoffs...made as explicit as 
possible," which demands "the ability to compare the costs and 
benefits of preserving different types" of resources.
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Moreover, the Report recognizes that environmental problems 
"vary with the stage of development, the structure of the economy 
and the incentives framework." Also, it holds that "the most 
immediate and life-threatening environmental problems facing 
developing countries... are different from those associated with 
the affluence of rich countries..."
There is "no attempt to be comprehensive.. .but rather it seeks 
to identify the most serious challenges and suggests strategies to 
address them." Among the most urgent for developing countries, the 
Report identifies four basic challenges: water and sanitation, 
considered "the most important...of all;" clean air, from energy 
and industry emissions; land management and productivity; and those 
which cross national borders, such as atmospheric changes.
The identification of an agenda for action, to confront these 
challenges, includes an evaluation of the "overall extra costs for 
local environmental concerns," which could represent 2-3 percent of 
developing country gross outputs, estimated to amount to $100 
billion per year by the end of the 1990s. This requires additional 
development finance to address local environmental problems, which 
"should not be viewed as separate from ongoing development needs," 
while "industrial countries must bear the costs of addressing 
global challenges."
V. 5. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
(WDW/15/92 3 JUNE 1992)
This is only the second year that the World Bank releases 
separately the analysis prepared by its International Economics 
Department for the World Development Report (WDW/11/92) . By 
contrast with last year's, focused on international trade in 
primary commodities, this year's Global Economic Prospects and the 
Developing Countries is centered on international trade in 
manufactures. It contains the following three chapters: 1) the
globa? economic outlook and the developing countries; 2) global 
conditions for international trade; and 3) interlinkages, human 
capital and export competitiveness.
The 1990s started badly for the developing countries. GDP 
growth at less than 2 percent in 1990 and 1991 and per capita 
income declining in both years, constitute the first time this has 
happened since 1965, when the World Bank started collecting data on 
these trends. However, the prospects for the developing countries 
during the rest of the decade indicate higher rates of growth of 
4.9 percent, up from 3.2 percent in the eighties. This positive 
outcome depends from the implementation of improved policies in a 
mixed external economic environment, which is likely to include
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slower growth in the industrial countries, on average at 2.6 
percent a year; lower real interest rates, at around 3 percent; a 
cumulative increase in commodity prices of 15 percent in real 
terms; and scarce external finance.
The cornerstone of this relatively promising future is an 
increase in the export of manufactures by the developing countries, 
which can be decisively helped by external factors, such as lower 
trade barriers and higher growth rates in the industrialized 
countries. For instance, a 50 percent reduction in the trade 
barriers of the European Community, Japan and the United States 
could generate an increase of 15 percent in the exports of 
developing countries, or US $54 billion in 1991 prices. This is 
almost equivalent to the aggregate net resource flows from official 
sources to developing countries, which in 1991 amounted to $57 
billion. Also, an increase of only one percentage point a year in 
the growth of OECD countries, sustained over three years, would 
raise the exports of developing countries by $60 billion annually.
In this context, there are differences in the performance of 
developing countries during this decade. For instance, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is expected to grow at 3.5 percent per year, barely enough 
to keep pace with rapid population growth. Latin America will 
"improve sharply," with a per capita GDP growth of 2.2 percent a 
year in this decade, "based on a continued resolution of the debt 
crisis and a significant shift toward market-friendly policies." 
South Asian GDP per capita growth will remain near the rate of 3 
percent of the previous decade, while East Asia "is unlikely to 
repeat its impressive economic performance of the past decade," 
although it will remain the fastest growing at a rate of over 5 
percent of growth in per capita income. Finally, prospects for 
growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union "in the years 
ahead are highly uncertain." Even so, peace, reconstruction and 
policy reforms are expected to generate an aggregate per capita GDP 
rate of 1.6 percent annually, which contrasts positively with the 
decline of 1.6 percent of the eighties.
To sustain these rates of growth in the nineties, developing 
countries need to increase even more their exports of manufactures. 
This is feasible since even with the current levels of protection 
in the industrialized countries, manufactures already account for 
almost 50 percent of all merchandise exports from developing 
countries. This means that the rate of export growth in the 
developing countries is expected to rise from 5.8 percent in the 
1980s to 7 percent in the 1990s.
Since almost 45 percent of world trade in manufactures already 
takes place within regional trading arrangements, the Report argues 
that global welfare could be enhanced, if lower trade barriers are 
maintained against third parties. However, the risk is recognized 
that these regional arrangements may turn inward, to the detriment
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of the global trading system and of those developing countries 
which remain outside these arrangements.
Finally, as an indicator of the increased globalization of 
manufacturing production and marketing, by the early 1980s 
intrafirm trade within the largest 350 transnational corporations 
(TNCs) contributed about 40 percent of global trade. This increased 
specialization, within branches and within different stages of 
production, is opening possibilities for developing countries to 
become competitive low-cost suppliers of manufactures.
Nonetheless, the Report cautions that "remaining the low cost 
supplier requires more than cheap labor," it demands changes in 
technology, product mix and work practices, with all of these 
changes requiring "continuing improvements in the education and 
skill level of the work force." The conclusion is that "no country 
wants to depend on low wages to remain a low cost supplier. Raising 
living standards without losing international competitiveness means 
increasing productivity."
Consequently, two groups of developing countries are likely to 
emerge. Those "with a well educated labor force, and with open 
international trade and investment flows, are likely to absorb 
innovative production and management techniques rapidly." Second, 
those "that fail to develop information links or to emphasize human 
resource development will find increasingly difficult to compete 
successfully in the global market."
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VI. TRADE
VI. 1. THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1992 
(WDW/8/92 11 MARCH 1992)
Section 1641 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, mandates that "the President shall submit to the Congress 
during each calendar year (but not later than March 1) a report on 
A) the operation of the trade agreements program ... and B) the 
national trade policy agenda for the year in which the report is 
submitted." Both appear in a single volume released by the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on 28 February 1992.
This year's trade policy agenda comprises the same three 
objectives of last year's, grouped under somewhat different 
headings:
A) the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round;
B) regional and bilateral trade liberalization initiatives 
with key trading partners, such as the completion "as soon as 
possible" of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with 
Mexico and Canada; further progress on the Enterprise for the 
Americas (EAI); and to increase access to specific markets, such as 
Japan's.
C) to use the strength of the U.S. domestic market to enforce 
trade agreements and "to encourage further sectoral market 
openings."
The draft Final Act issued by the Director General of the 
GATT, Arthur Dunkel, with some reservations, can be the basis for 
the successful completion of the Uruguay Round, which "could 
provide a $1 trillion boost to the U.S. economy over the next 
decade, resulting in new and better paying jobs for American 
workers."
The regional and bilateral initiatives to promote trade 
liberalization are classified geographically. In the Americas, the 
NAFTA negotiation is considered "the most ambitious regional 
initiative presently under way," which has already produced "a 
consolidated but heavily bracketed text." Even so, on concluding 
the negotiations, it is said: "we will not let speed be the enemy 
of a good agreement, but we also want to complete the agreement as 
soon as possible so that we might soon begin capturing its
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benefits.” The EAI, as well as the Andean Trade Preference Act and 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative are specifically mentioned as 
building blocks of a free trade zone from Alaska to Argentina.
In the Pacific Rim, Japan is in first place and the objective 
is "to expand access to the world's second largest industrial 
economy,” through "four tracks:" 1) sectoral agreements where 
"barriers and collusive practices in the Japanese market have 
impeded or precluded U.S. companies from making sales," such as 
paper products, flat glass, autos and auto parts; 2) to strengthen 
and expand the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), by 
enforcing Japan's anti-monopoly laws, repeal the barriers which 
prevent the establishment of large retailers in Japan and creating 
more openings for private investors; 3) better access to the 
Japanese market through the Uruguay Round; and 4) to open up 
Japan's closed corporate markets.
China is cited as subject to two section 301 investigations, 
on deficient protection of intellectual property rights and on 
market access barriers, while the issues of textile fraud and goods 
made with prison labor are also mentioned as subject to 
investigation.
In Asia and the Pacific region the objectives are: 1) to
increase market access for U.S. exports and 2) to encourage 
countries to adhere to multilateral trade rules ar disciplines. 
Other long term goals include Korean membership in t:. Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), participation in 
the GATT for Taiwan and China, the graduation of the members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from developing 
country status and the creation of a regional organization based on 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process.
In Europe and the Mediterranean, the most important goals with 
the European Community are the completion of the Uruguay Round, as 
well as sectoral concerns, such as subsidies to civil aircraft 
manufacturers, steel producers, ship-builders and the oilseeds 
sector, quotas on U.S. films shown on television, and electrical 
and telecommunications utilities that exclude foreign products. 
Central and Eastern Europe will benefit from the Generalized System 
of Preferences, while in the Mediterranean the priorities are to 
strengthen Turkey's intellectual property rights, to improve the 
free trade agreement with Israel and to expand trade with the Arab 
world. In Near East Asia, the Section 301 investigation of India 
will be completed, while there is interest in expanding bilateral 
trade and investment in Africa.
Under sectoral negotiations appears replacing the Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements, before 31 March 1992, with a Multilateral 
Steel Agreement with 30 countries; the conclusion of the 
negotiations with the Airbus consortium countries, as well as with
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the chief shipbuilding nations; and the replacement of the 
Multifibre Agreement, after 31 December 1992, by the new agreement 
reached within the Uruguay Round. Also, the "increasing overlap 
between environmental actions and trade policies" is specifically 
recognized, while the implementation of the 1988 Trade Act and 
other statutes is promised.
Finally, addressing the intensification of protectionist 
rhetoric, generated by this year's political campaign, Ambassador 
Hills warns that "those who advocate closing the U.S. market to 
balance our trade are courting decline, not growth. More than ever, 
she concludes, we need the billions of dollars a year of economic 
stimulus that an open world trading system and access to foreign 
markets provide."
VI. 2. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS 
(WDW/14/92 27 MAY 1992)
As mandated by section 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, on March 30, the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) released the 1992 National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTBÏ. Before 27 April 
1990, when the USTR declared a "cease fire," this publication 
indicated to the countries listed that they were submitted to 
scrutiny under the much dreaded "super 301" provision of the 1988 
Trade Act. Consequently, this year's Report was characterized by 
Ambassador Carla Hills as only "a useful tool for tracking barriers 
to U.S. exports and for reporting progress in eliminating them."
Understood as "government-imposed measures and policies that 
restrict, prevent, or impede the international exchange of goods 
and services," these barriers are classified into the following 
eight categories: 1) import policies; 2) standards, testing,
labeling, and certification; 3) government procurement; 4) export 
subsidies; 5) lack of intellectual property protection; 6) services 
barriers; 7) investment barriers; and 8) barriers that encompass 
more than one category or that affect a single sector.
The Report describes the barriers existent in "the largest 
export markets for the United States including 43 nations and two 
regional trading blocs." This year's list includes, for the first 
time, seven new countries, from Eastern Europe— Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland— and from Latin America— Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Paraguay. Also, an appendix describes market access 
barriers in the financial services sector, based on those cases 
that were brought to the attention of the USTR by the private 
sector.
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The exclusion of countries from the list is "primarily due to 
the relatively small size of their markets or the absence of major 
U.S. industry and agriculture trade complaints." However, absentees 
from the list are specifically cautioned that this "should not be 
interpreted as implying they are no longer of concern for the 
United States."
The inclusion of the three Eastern European countries was seen 
as a signal that they have become stable enough as to be considered 
"on the same footing as other U.S. trading partners." Among the 
newly nominated Latin American countries, Ecuador was cited for 
patent violations, while El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay are 
listed for tolerating piracy of copyrights.
Measured by the length of their citations, Japan appears in 
the first place with 19 pages, followed by the European Community 
with 17, Canada with 15, Korea with 11, China with 10, India and 
Mexico with 9, and Taiwan with 8.
Each country is listed alphabetically and the enumeration of 
the barriers is preceded by ranking each country according to its 
relative importance as an export market for the United States. Also 
mentioned are the magnitude of the U.S. trade deficit or surplus, 
as well the amount of U.S. imports and exports and of U.S. 
investment.
For the other six Latin American countries mentioned, not all 
the citations are negative. For instance, Argentina's "sweeping 
reform" and the resulting significant reduction in trade barriers 
are positively mentioned. However, Argentine inadequate patent 
protection and exclusion of pharmaceutical products is criticized, 
as well as the lack of explicit protection for computer software. 
Under services barriers, as last year, Argentina's denial of 
licenses to foreign courier firms is specifically mentioned.
Brazil is praised for the progress made in the reduction of 
import licensing, with the notable exception of computer hardware 
and related digital electronics equipment. However, under criticism 
comes the lack of patent protection for chemical compounds, 
foodstuffs and chemical/pharmaceutical substances, as well as 
services and investment barriers in insurance, petroleum, public 
utilities, media, real state, shipping, and various "strategic 
industries."
Chile still exhibits one of the cleanest records, except for 
the copyright law and certain restrictions to foreign investment, 
such as the restriction to repatriate invested capital for three 
years, as well as certain limitations on royalty payments.
Colombia's economic reform program of "apertura" is commended, 
as well as the significant reductions in tariff levels and the
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virtual elimination of import licensing. However, the Report 
criticizes certain government procurement practices, such as the 
requirement of government-to-government contracts for major public 
works projects. Also, it is recalled that intellectual property 
issues have caused the inclusion of Colombia in the "watch list" 
under the "special 301" provision of the 1988 Trade Act.
The citation of Mexico includes a brief description of the 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) negotiations, although this 
does not preclude criticism of several sectoral rules, such as in 
energy, electronics, land, mining, pharmaceuticals and 
telecommunications.
Finally, Venezuela is praised for the substantial 
liberalization of quantitative restrictions and import levies, 
although it is still placed in the "special-301 watch list" for 
intellectual property rights issues.
To conclude, with the exception of the newcomers, the 
scorecard of the Latin American trading partners, basically, 
commends the unilateral liberalization that is taking place 
throughout the region.
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VII. INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
VII. 1. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND (MIF) CREATED 
(WDW/7/92 4 MARCH 1992)
Out of the three pillars of the Enterprise for the Americas 
(EAI), launched in June 1990 by President Bush, the investment 
component was lagging behind. The other two had experienced 
relative advances, such as the approval of the conversion of PL-480 
debt, or the signature of framework agreements on trade with almost 
all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
On February 11, the creation of the Multilateral Investment 
Fund (MIF), administered by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), signaled a major advance in the field of investment 
promotion.
The objectives of the MIF are: 1) to encourage the development 
and implementation of reforms to facilitate increased levels of 
private investment; 2) to encourage the adoption of development 
strategies and policies which increase private investment and an 
expanding private sector; 3) to stimulate micro-enterprises and 
small businesses; 4) to identify policy reforms to increase 
investment, alleviate some of the costs of implementing such 
reforms and broaden the participation of small entrepreneurs; 
finally, 5) to promote environmentally sound and sustainable 
economic development.
To carry out these objectives, the operations of the MIF will 
consist of grants to finance technical assistance and education, as 
well as loans and equity investments to support micro and small 
enterprises
These operations will be managed through three facilities: the 
technical cooperation facility, the human resources facility and 
the small enterprise development facility.
The technical cooperation facility will provide grants to 
governments, privatization agencies, stock exchanges or others, to 
undertake: country diagnostic studies to identify investment
constraints; national country plans for the comprehensive reform of 
the policy and legal environment for investment; advisory services 
to carry out such reforms, as well as privatization programs; and 
assistance to remove impediments to healthy competition, to develop 
sound prudential safeguards, to expand the capabilities of the
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banking sector and capital or commodity markets.
The human resources facility will provide grants to
governments and educational institutions to develop the human 
resource base by means of training of workers and managers in 
vocational activities and regulatory functions.
The small enterprise development facility will provide
financing to micro-enterprises and smaller businesses through 
grants to non-governmental organizations and domestic financial 
institutions, including financial intermediaries, to expand the 
services available to improve financial and business practices; to 
develop innovative financial services; to prepare business plans, 
as well as to identify business opportunities and sources of
financing.
Also, a Small Enterprise Investment Fund will be established 
to make loans, equity investments and quasi-equity investments to 
smaller business and micro-enterprises, as well as to non­
governmental organizations and domestic financial institutions.
All developing member countries of the IDB are potentially 
eligible recipients of financing from the MIF, provided that they 
are in compliance with an investment sector loan agreement with the 
IDB, as well as committed to implementing sound macroeconomic 
policies and investment reforms and in compliance with other
relevant international financial institutions.
MIF's decisions will be adopted by weighted voting of three 
quarters majority of total voting power. The Fund has its own 
decision making structure, different to the structure that rules 
the approval of regular Bank operations, with each member having 
proportional as well as basic votes. One proportional vote 
corresponds to each one hundred thousand US dollars contributed in 
convertible currencies, while basic votes result from the equal 
distribution among all the contributors of twenty percent of the 
aggregate sum of the basic and the proportional votes of all the 
members.
The contributions pledged at the time of signing the agreement 
establishing the MIF amounted to $1.25 billion and will be made in 
five equal annual installments, as follows: $500 million each from 
Japan and the United States; $50 million from Spain; $30 million 
each from Canada, Germany and Italy; $20 million each from 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela; $15 million from France; 
$5 million each from Chile and Colombia; $4 million from Portugal; 
$3 million from Uruguay; $1 million from Peru; and $600,000 each 
from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
There were some conspicuous extra-regional absentees from this 
list, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland and
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Belgium, as well as the countries of the Caribbean, Bolivia and 
Ecuador, which pledged to participate in the near future. However, 
the presence of several extra-regional members of the IDB dispels 
somewhat the suspicion that the Enterprise of the Americas was 
aimed at the creation of a closed hemispheric bloc. Also, by 
contrast to individual country activities, there are no provisions 
in the articles of agreement for the support of regional projects.
Finally, it will be a while before the MIF can start 
operations, particularly depending from the speed with which Japan 
and the United States, the major contributors, will ratify their 
contributions.
VII. 2. THE BOOM IN LATIN AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 
(WDW/17/92 17 JUNE 1992)
Who would have believed, just a few years ago, that the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, in the nineties, were 
going to experience plentiful capital inflows. Given the reluctance 
of commercial banks to lend and the emergence elsewhere of 
relatively more urgent demands for world savings, no alternative 
was seen to the reliance on internal savings.
Several recent trends, some of them difficult to quantify, are 
disproving this dire prediction. First, some of the capital that 
flew out of the region is returning. Other countries are receiving 
respectable amounts of transfers from their citizens resident 
abroad. Finally, most intriguing is the inflow of resources to 
invest in the incipient capital markets of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
According to the Factbook on "emerging stock markets," 
released by the International Financial Corporation (IFC), among 33 
markets monitored, six of the best performers in 1991 were in Latin 
America. Argentina led the way with an increase of 400 percent in 
U.S. dollar terms, followed by Colombia (191 percent), Brazil (173 
percent), Pakistan (172 percent), Mexico (107 percent), Chile (99 
percent), Philippines (59 percent) and Venezuela (48 percent).
The surge in these markets is attributed by the IFC "to 
favorable foreign and domestic reaction to economic reforms that 
included fiscal deficit reductions, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, reduction of inflation, financial system reform and 
liberalization of international trade and investment flows, as well 
as to the fact that Latin American stocks looked relatively cheap 
at the start of the year."
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Another salient feature of 1991 was the intensification of the 
linkages between these emerging markets and international capital 
markets, by means of equity and convertible bond issues, 
particularly those floated by Latin American countries during the 
second half of the year. The Factbook asserts that "1991 may well 
be remembered as the year Latin American companies returned to the 
international capital markets and foreign investors re-discovered 
the Americas."
Mexico was particularly successful in attracting some of these 
flows, receiving about $6 billion in new stock market investment. 
The "deal of the year" was the sale of stock by the Mexican 
government of Telefonos de Mexico (TELMEX), for $2.4 billion, "the 
largest international equity offering to date by a company 
headquartered in a developing country." Other Latin American stock 
markets were also able to attract foreign funds, such as Brazil 
$850 million and Argentina close to $600 million.
Impressive as well, in 1991, was the organization of "at 
least ten international funds for Latin America as a region," which 
raised around $635 million. Additionally, two funds created for 
Argentina reached $110 million; three funds for Brazil amounted to 
$240 million; and a fund for Chile raised $50 million. All these 
activities pushed the amount of "new money dedicated to Latin 
American stock markets by country funds in 1991 to just over $1.0 
billion."
A brief review of market performance, in 1991, reveals the 
intensification of transactions in the six most successful Latin 
American markets mentioned.
Argentina's stock market "had the best year by far among the 
world's stock markets," registering an all-time record in total 
value traded of $4.8 billion, up from $0.9 billion in 1990. The 
Brazilian stock market, in 1991, "was the fourth best performer 
among the world's stock markets," with total value traded more than 
doubling to $13.4 billion. Chile came in sixth place, among the 
twenty emerging markets monitored by the IFC, with total value 
traded rising to almost $2 billion, the highest level in fifteen 
years. Colombia's exchanges responded vigorously to the 
announcement of new foreign investment regulations, with daily 
trading in both the Bogota and the Medellin exchanges averaging 
$1.65 million, up from $0.14 million registered during 1990 and in 
the first eight months of 1991. Mexico ranked fifth in stock market 
performance in 1991, with the total value traded reaching $31.7 
billion, double the previous record set in 1987. Finally, 
Venezuela's total trading value rose to $3.2 billion in 1991 from 
$2.2 billion in 1990.
The intensification of two-way capital flows, into and from 
Latin America, has gained the attention of the powerful Securities
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Industry Association (SIA), integrated by more than 600 securities 
brokerage and investment banking firms in the United States and 
Canada, which accounts for 90 percent of securities activity in 
North America.
In the negotiations to create a North American free trade area 
(NAFTA), the SIA is urging the opening of the Mexican securities 
markets by requesting the inclusion of nine principles aimed at 
achieving freedom of capital flows within NAFTA: 1) elimination of 
discriminatory financial services barriers; 2) national treatment 
and equality of competitive opportunity; 3) cross-border sale and 
purchase of financial services in primary and secondary markets; 4) 
creation of a trilateral panel to review the phase-out of 
transitional arrangements; 5) coverage of existing and future 
services or products; 6) transparency of laws and regulations; 7) 
dispute settlement procedures; 8) long-term harmonization of 
regulatory policies; and 9) adequate provision for other nations of 
the Hemisphere to become signatories to the agreement.
VII. 3. LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FINANCE MINISTERS COME TO 
WASHINGTON (WDW/19/92 1 JULY 1992)
In an unprecedented first, on June 24 and 25, eleven Ministers 
of Finance from Latin America and the Caribbean— Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela— came to Washington to meet with 
their colleague, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States 
Nicholas Brady.
The purpose, as expressed in the "statement" issued at the 
conclusion of the meeting, was "to discuss economic and financial 
issues of mutual concern." However, it is necessary to try to read 
between the lines of the statement in order to gain some clarity 
about what happened within the closed chambers of the meeting.
First of all, the Ministers expressly recognized the 
qualitative change in Hemispheric relations that has been evolving 
since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, they "affirmed The New 
Partnership that exists within the Hemisphere," based on the 
following four principles: "(1) the mutuality of interests between 
countries throughout the hemisphere in achieving stronger economies 
and stable democracies; (2) the importance of sustained economic 
recovery and adjustment and of a broadening of the benefits of 
economic growth to all levels of society; (3) the crucial role 
played by open trade and investment markets and stronger financial 
markets, and (4) the long-term significance of the Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative."
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The main highlights of the meeting fall within these four 
categories, which constitute the pillars of the so-called "New 
Partnership."
The "mutuality of interests" underlines that the days are gone 
when the relations between the northern and the southern part of 
the Hemisphere were perceived as a zero-sum game. Presently, there 
exists a commitment "to sustaining economic recovery and to moving 
to free and open markets," as expressed in "the goal of a 
Hemispheric Free Trade Zone as outlined in the Enterprise 
Initiative." In this same sense, the Ministers also "stressed the 
importance of continued progress on negotiations on regional trade 
matters, such as NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Area) and 
other initiatives."
Additionally, the Ministers "underscored the importance of a 
propitious international economic climate and of freer market 
access to underpin growth in Latin America and the Caribbean." They 
also "welcomed the progress being made in attracting renewed flows 
of capital and investment into the region and emphasized the 
critical role played by financial services and stronger financial 
markets."
For achieving the "broadening of the benefits of economic 
growth to all levels of society," the Ministers recognized: first, 
"the need to broaden participation in sustainable and 
environmentally sound economic activity;" second, they also "noted 
the necessity of controlling inflation as a basis for social well­
being and good governance;" and third, they "underscored that there 
is no contradiction between economic stability and growth or 
between economic growth and social justice."
Finally, the statement concludes making reference to three 
concrete issues. First, there was agreement that "negotiations on 
the 8th Replenishment of the resources for the Inter-American 
Development Bank should begin this autumn and that these should 
focus on defining a renewed role for the IDB to address the 
region's changing requirements." This can be seen as an expression 
of support for the Bank's capital increase, as well as a reference 
to opening IDB direct lending to the private sector. Second, the 
Ministers "emphasized the urgency of reaching a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round." And third, in a concluding 
reference to the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative, the 
Ministers "urged timely implementation of all its elements." This 
last was interpreted as a direct reference to some of the 
difficulties confronted in the U.S. Congress by the debt and the 
investment components of the Initiative. Which apparently was one 
of the main concerns addressed during the meeting, because it all 
started with an early breakfast with several influential members of 
the U.S. Congress.
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Some interpretations previously offered tried to find the 
deeper meaning of this unprecedented meeting, as for instance an 
Op-Ed published in the Journal of Commerce, by Richard Feinberg and 
Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue, "a Washington-based 
policy center.” The fact that the meeting was taking place only two 
weeks before the G-Seven Summit in Munich indicated, for Feinberg 
and Hakim, that this was the first time Washington was seeking "the 
advice of Latin America in preparation for a G-7 encounter," as 
well as that it was seeking to "represent a hemispheric view at a 
global meeting." Unfortunately, Secretary Brady at the closing 
press conference dismissed this linkage saying that the meeting 
with the Latin American Ministers was completely separate of the 
next G-Seven Summit.
However, beyond these interpretations, most impressive was the 
way the main newspapers in the United States ignored the meeting. 
Except for the already mentioned Op-Ed and a brief notice about its 
conclusion in The Journal of Commerce, there was no coverage of the 
meeting or of its results in the major U.S. newspapers. This 
indicates that it was not considered as newsworthy as the 
presidential campaign, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, or the 
economic assistance for the former Soviet Union.
VII. 4. PRESIDENT-ELECT CLINTON AND INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
(WDW/34/92 18 NOVEMBER 1992)
At the first press conference given by President-elect Clinton 
in Little Rock, Arkansas, when asked what were his foreign policy 
priorities, he answered: "a multi-year plan for a defense budget 
that I think keeps the defense of this country the strongest in the 
world...; continued efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with Russia 
and with other superpowers; to stop the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; keeping the Middle East process on track...; to 
strengthen global economic growth, in terms of resolving 
outstanding matters with Mexico, hopefully resolving the 
outstanding issues in Europe, and proceeding with a cooperative 
strategy with the other major economic powers to promote global 
growth."
Some commentators immediately concluded that the lack of 
direct reference to Latin America or to the Western Hemisphere 
could be interpreted as an indicator of the loss of salience that 
Inter-American affairs will experience during the next 
Administration.
However, as advised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Argentina, Guido Di Telia, who visited Washington over the weekend 
to inform himself about the agenda of the new Administration, it is
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still too early to "jump to conclusions."
For one thing, one of the most important signals about the 
orientation of the new Administration still has to be heard, in the
form of the persons that will be appointed to occupy some key 
positions, such as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, or Undersecretary of the Treasury for International 
Affairs.
Second, another very important signal will be the way in which 
the new Administration will handle the process of approval of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Much depends on the 
way the NAFTA is approved, because further trade negotiations in 
the Hemisphere could be based on the so-called "docking clause," by 
which other countries may accede to the NAFTA (WDW/31/92).
It should be recalled that the supporters of former Governor 
Clinton are aligned in two different camps concerning the NAFTA 
(WDW/29/92). On one side are those calling for the renegotiation of 
the agreement, among them are the powerful unions grouped under the 
AFL-CIO, as well as some very active environmental groups, such as 
the Sierra Club. On the other side are those in favor of approving 
the agreement as it was negotiated, among whom appears prominently 
the very influential head of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.).
There are several indications that this rift still persists, 
despite the endorsement by then candidate Clinton of the agreement 
as it was negotiated, if and when it was accompanied by three 
supplemental agreements and five legislative conditions.
Recently, Bill Cunningham, a lobbyist for the AFL-CIO quoted 
in The Washington Post, anticipated NAFTA would cause "a blood 
bath" in Congress, which would bring to an early conclusion the 
traditional "honeymoon" enjoyed by any incoming Administration. 
Cunningham said, "bringing this up early has the ability of 
attenuating whatever honeymoon there will be."
However, on the positive side, the influential House Majority 
Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) does not sound as pessimistic. 
Although quoted as saying he would prefer to renegotiate the NAFTA, 
Congressman Gephardt "believes his objections could be answered in 
the way Governor Clinton envisions."
Be it as it may, the last and probably the most decisive 
signal to be monitored has to do with the reactivation of the U.S. 
economy. After all, the election was won and lost because of the 
voters' domestic economic concerns (WDW/33/92). Also, the 
victorious candidate promised that he would focus on the economy 
"as a laser beam."
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Additionally, in the rather detailed and lengthy statement 
made during the campaign in Raleigh, North Carolina, supporting the 
NAFTA without renegotiation but with conditions, then Governor 
Clinton said: "in the end, whether the NAFTA is a good thing for 
America is not a question of foreign policy. It is a question of 
domestic policy."
For all these reasons, an early strong signal in the direction 
of economic reactivation in the U.S. economy will help sustain the 
turnaround in consumer confidence that has followed the election. 
In its turn, a positive economic outlook would restrain some of the 
protectionist pressures that are present among organized labor, as 
well as among some environmental organizations, which have found 
expression in Congress.
In the terms of Professor Abraham Lowenthal, director of the 
Center of International Studies at the University of Southern 
California, "even a signed, sealed and delivered North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) wouldn't be sustainable if the U.S. is 
in a prolonged recession or depression."
In conclusion, Argentina's Foreign Minister Di Telia is right, 
it is still too early to jump to conclusions about the orientation 
the Clinton Administration will adopt on Inter-American relations. 
Three signals still have to be heard: first and foremost, the U.S. 
economy should be perceived as heading towards reactivation; 
second, this would augur well for the approval of the NAFTA, as it 
will be signed by President Bush on December 17; and third, the 
names of those who will be responsible for Inter-American economic 
affairs will have to be released.
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VIII. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTAS
VIII. 1. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE NAFTA
(WDW 4/92 9 SEPTEMBER 1992)
On August 2 , 1992, the governments of Canada, Mexico and the 
United States announced "the completion of negotiations for a North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) . The full text of the 
agreement was released only today because, as the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR), Ambassador Carla Hills declared on August 
12, "after we shook hands this morning, we turned to our lawyers 
who have been working side-by-side with us, and asked them to give 
the document a legal scrub."
Even so, a description of the proposed agreement was also 
released in which several highlights appear:
Tariff elimination: out of 9,000 tariff items, 50% will 
be eliminated immediately; 15% in five years; and for the rest
there are gradations of between six and fifteen years;
Rules of origin: there are multiple rules of origin; for 
instance, in automobiles the reguirement can go as high as 62.5%; 
for textiles the rule is "yarn forward," meaning that the good be 
produced with yarn from a NAFTA member, and even a "fiber forward" 
for cotton and man made fiber yarns; there is also a "de minimis" 
provision, by which goods that do not fall under specific rules 
will be of NAFTA origin when the non-NAFTA materials represent no 
more than 7% of its total cost;
Agriculture: separate bilateral regulations on trade
between Canada and Mexico and between Mexico and the United States, 
while the provisions of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement will
continue to apply to agricultural trade between them.
Financial services: comprising banking, insurance and 
securities, allows these services providers to establish operations 
in any NAFTA country, with some exceptions, as in the case of 
Mexico where this rule is restricted by market share limits during 
a transition period ending by the year 2000.
Land transportation: after a transition period of three 
years, truck operators from the U.S. and Canada will be allowed to 
make cross-border deliveries in Mexican border states and the U.S. 
will allow Mexican truck operators to perform the same services; 
and six years aftc the signature of the agreement, trucking firms 
from the three merorer countries will be allowed to provide services 
throughout the NAFTA territory.
Investment: it removes significant barriers by granting
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national treatment, ensuring basic protection and providing a 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes.
Intellectual property rights: it provides a level of
protection that is higher than any other bilateral or multilateral 
agreement.
Environment: it sets stringent standards and encourages 
'•upward harmonization," prohibiting the lowering of standards to 
attract investment.
Antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD): a
mechanism is established to review final AD and CVD determinations 
made by the administrative authorities of each member country.
Dispute settlement procedures: all differences will be 
settled first by consultations, in which the third country may 
participate; if these fail, settlement will be sought at
ministerial level through good offices, mediation and conciliation; 
if these fail, panel proceedings may be initiated, although GATT or 
NAFTA proceedings may be pursued.
Institutional aspects: besides creating several special 
committees to deal with the day-to-day functioning of the 
agreement, such as labelling for textile products, federal 
automotive standards, agricultural trade, sanitary and
phitosanitary measures, standards-related measures, competition 
laws, "the central institution" created is a trade commission at 
ministerial level, as well as a secretariat to serve the
commission.
Docking clause: the agreement is open to the accession of 
other countries.
The next steps in the United States consist in the "fast 
track" procedures applicable to the approval of those agreements 
signed before June 1, 1993. Upon completion of the negotiations, 
the President may give formal notice to the Congress that he 
intends to sign the agreement and he can proceed with the signature 
ninety calendar days after giving notice. Any time after signing, 
the President may submit the legislation necessary to implement the 
agreement, which has to be approved or rejected with no amendments 
by the Congress within ninety "session" days. As described by 
Ambassador Hills, "that works out to about eight months. So we have 
a good process and a significant time span ahead of us."
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that this is an election year 
in the United States and the negotiation of the agreement has 
already become a key campaign issue. On one side, the Republican 
Administration appears determined to sign the agreement before the 
election. On the other, the Democrats appear divided. Governor 
Clinton has said that he wants to wait until the text of the 
agreement is available. However, Congressman Richard Gephardt (D- 
Mo.), House Majority Leader, said just days before the conclusion 
of the negotiations, on 27 July 1992, that the agreement is not 
acceptable in its current form, since it does not deal adequately 
with labor and human rights, as well as transborder pollution and
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environmental standards. Stay tuned.
VIII. 2. NAFTA INITIALED
(WDW/29/92 14 OCTOBER 1992)
It is an illustration of how free trade wit; n the Western 
Hemisphere has become a campaign issue in the United States that a 
formal ceremony was held, in San Antonio, Texas, on October 7, to 
initialize the text of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), already approved on August 12 (WDW/24/92).
The San Antonio ceremony had only symbolic value and was 
attended by Presidents Bush, Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney, 
as well as by the NAFTA negotiators, Ambassador Carla Hills, 
Secretary Jaime Serra and Minister Michael Wilson.
President Bush notified Congress, on September 18, of his 
intent to sign the agreement, signaling the beginning of the 
required 90-day notification period, which means that the formal 
signature can only take place on or after December 17. Meanwhile, 
the countdown of the 90 session days, during which Congress has to 
vote up or down the agreement, will only be triggered until the 
President transmits to the Congress the necessary implementing 
legislation, which he can do any time after the signature. In all, 
these requirements can consume up to eight months, which means that 
if the ratification of the agreement by the three parties can be 
expected to happen sometime in 1993, the NAFTA cannot take effect 
before 1 January 1994.
However, beyond its symbolic value, initialing the NAFTA 
produced one important result, because it finally brought Governor 
Clinton to come out openly to endorse the pact, which assured its 
approval by Congress whoever is elected in November.
The loudest sigh of relief, after the endorsement, came from 
Mexico, where the outcome of the U.S. presidential election has 
become, according to The New York Times, "a referendum on the 
country's economic future." For instance, the next day, the Mexico 
City stock exchange experienced a leap of 4.65 percent, the second 
largest gain of the year. Also, President Salinas himself told 
businessmen in Mexico City, the morning after the endorsement, 
"there is now broad national consensus that confirms that the free 
trade agreement is on a very good road toward its legislative stage 
and its later enactment."
Moreover, the assertion made by Governor Clinton's advisors 
that it will be easier for a Democratic President to obtain 
approval for the NAFTA from a Democratic Congress was immediately
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confirmed. Representative Robert Matsui (D-Cal.), influential 
member of the international trade subcommittee, of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, declared he would support the NAFTA "only 
under a Clinton Presidency."
Still, some doubts remained. Governor Clinton's endorsement 
was not perceived as wholehearted as expected. He was seen as 
"walking down a tightrope," pulled in different directions by 
conflicting advise coming out from within his own camp. On one 
side, House majority leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) has openly 
called for renegotiating the agreement to improve its provisions on 
labor and the environment. On the other side, Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
(D-Tex.), a strong candidate for Secretary of the Treasury in a 
future Clinton Administration, supports the agreement as it has 
been negotiated.
These positions are also backed by some very powerful 
supporters. As stated by AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, "workers 
and their unions are convinced that the agreement is seriously 
flawed and cannot be corrected by any method other than 
renegotiation." Or by the environmentalists, whose ranks fractured 
when the powerful National Wildlife Federation came out in support 
of the environmental components of the agreement.
Such differences among Governor Clinton's supporters explain 
why it took a while before he presented his proposal for a third 
way on this polarized issue, which allegedly has been miscast as a 
simple choice between protectionism and free trade. In Governor 
Clinton's terms, his position lies between an Administration 
investing the NAFTA with "all our hopes," and "some Democrats" who 
fear that "freer trade today always equals exporting jobs and 
lowering wages."
To avoid these extremes, Governor Clinton endorsed the NAFTA 
and opposed its renegotiation, if and when three "supplemental 
agreements" could be signed at the same time. Two of them would 
create an environmental protection commission and an employment 
standards commission, with "the power to provide remedies, 
including money damages, and the legal power to stop pollution," as 
well as to resolve labor disputes. The third commission would deal 
with unexpected import surges resulting from free trade. Governor 
Clinton also said he would pursue five goals in Congress to improve 
the NAFTA: a comprehensive job training program; new spending on 
the environment and infrastructure; assistance for farmers hurt by 
Mexican imports; greater public participation in trade disputes 
with Mexico; and explicit rules to prevent use of Mexican and 
Canadian workers to break strikes in the United States.
The reactions did not wait. Ambassador Carla Hills said there 
was no need for the supplemental pacts, adding that "it's clear he 
does not know what is in the agreement." Among others, The New York
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Times editorialized characterizing Governor Clinton's approach as 
"free trade, but with time bombs." Finally, President Salinas 
speaking to reporters before addressing a meeting of the U.S. 
Business Council described the NAFTA as "a good agreement" and said 
that before responding, it was better to "wait for the Americans to 
decide. Wait until after November 3."
VIII. 3. NAFTA: THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
(WDW/31/92 28 OCTOBER 1992)
Viewed from afar, the institutional structure created by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), initialed on October 
7 in the presence of the Prime Minister of Canada and the 
Presidents of Mexico and the United States (WDW/29/92), looks very 
simple.
Articles 2001 and 2002 of the NAFTA create a free trade 
commission and a secretariat, respectively. The Commission is 
formed with "cabinet-level representatives or their designees," to 
perform the following functions: "a) supervise the implementation 
of the agreement; b) oversee its further elaboration; c) resolve 
disputes that may arise regarding its interpretation or 
application; d) supervise the work of all committees and working 
groups...; and e) consider any other matter that may affect the 
operation of this Agreement." The Commission "shall convene at 
least once a year in regular session...chaired successively by each 
Party."
The Commission also oversees the functioning of the 
Secretariat composed of national sections. Each member government 
will "establish a permanent office of its Section," to perform the 
following functions: a) provide assistance to the Commission; b) 
provide administrative assistance to other panels and committees 
and c) to otherwise facilitate the operation of the Agreement.
Probably one of the most salient traits of this very simple 
structure is that it follows the precedent set by the other two 
free trade agreements previously signed by the United States with 
Israel and Canada, because it relies on a secretariat composed of 
national sections, instead of creating a permanent bureaucracy to 
perform the task of servicing the intergovernmental instances.
However, in addition to the system of arbitration panels for 
the settlement of disputes (Subchapter B, Chapter 20), a closer 
look at the NAFTA reveals a rather complex structure formed of 
several committees, panels and advisory boards, charged with the 
performance of specific tasks mainly through periodic meetings. A 
brief description of some of these bodies and their mandates 
illustrates the complexity of this institutional structure. For
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instance, the following committees can meet at least annually:
Trade in Goods (Art.317): to deal with any matter related 
to national treatment and market access for goods.
Worn Clothing (Art. 300-B, Section 9.1): "to assess the 
potential effects that may result from the elimination of 
restrictions...on trade in worn clothing and other worn articles."
Agricultural Trade (Art. 708): to monitor and promote 
cooperation, by means of at least semi-annual consultations and 
annual reports to the Commission.
Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures (Art. 764): to
facilitate the enhancement of food safety and improvement, through 
technical cooperation and consultations.
- Standards-Related Measures (Art. 913): to monitor
implementation and facilitate compatibility through technical 
advice and consultations on application and enforcement, as well as 
through specific subcommittees (Art. 913 (5)) on land
transportation, telecommunications, automotive, and labeling of 
textiles and apparel.
Small Business (Art. 1021): identification of
opportunities for training, partnerships, data bases and criteria 
for eligibility.
Financial Services (Art. 1414): to implement dispute
settlement procedures and to examine technical issues.
Private Commercial Disputes (Art. 2022 (4)): to provide 
recommendations to the Commission on the effectiveness of 
arbitration and other procedures for the resolution of disputes.
Additionally, the following working groups are established:
Rules of Origin (Art. 513): to monitor implementation by 
the customs administrations and, through a subgroup (Art. 513 (6)), 
to agree on uniform interpretations on tariff classification and 
valuation as well as revisions of the certificate of origin, by 
meeting at least four times a year.
Agricultural Subsidies (Art. 706 (6)): to monitor the
volume and price of subsidized imports and to agree on the 
limitation or elimination of export subsidies, by means of semi­
annual meetings as well as annual reports to the Commission.
Agricultural Grading and Marketing Standards (Art. 704.3, 
Section I and Sect. II) between Mexico and the United States and 
Mexico and Canada, to review the operation of agreed standards.
- Trade and Competition (Art. 1504): to make recommendations 
to the Commission on the relationship between competition laws and 
policies and trade within the area.
- Temporary Entry (Art. 1605): to facilitate temporary entry 
of business persons and their spouses.
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Finally, the Commission is also charged with establishing "a 
framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral 
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits" (Art. 101 (f)) of 
the Agreement. In conjunction with the so-called "docking clause" 
(Art. 2205), on accession, this means that "any country or group of 
countries may accede to this Agreement to such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed between such country or countries and the 
Commission and following approval in accordance with the applicable 
approval procedures of each country."
This brief revision of some of the main institutional 
requirements contained in the NAFTA reveals the complex 
institutional structure envisaged by the Agreement.
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IX. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IX. 1. THE WORLD BANK'S RESEARCH PROGRAM 
(WDW/16/92 10 JUNE 1992)
During fiscal year 1991, expenditures in research activities 
at the World Bank amounted to $22.3 million, to finance 132 staff 
years, down from $23.7 million in FY90, with staff time remaining 
virtually unchanged. These expenditures represented, in FY91, 15.2 
percent of all the analytical work carried out by the Bank and 
accounted for 3.7 percent of the Bank's administrative budget, down 
from 17.5 percent and 4.3 percent in FY90, respectively. The other 
analytical activities, not considered research, were economic and 
sector work, as well as policy analysis, which accounted for 57 and 
28 percent, respectively.
By contrast with FY90, when the Annual Research Report was 
centered on the relation between research and operational 
activities, the special focus of the FY91 REPORT is on the external 
impact of these activities, by assessing "the contribution of 
research to the Bank's intellectual leadership in development."
Some of the indicators that measure the impact of Bank's 
research include direct use in policy settings, analyzed in several 
case studies; the utilization of Bank publications for educational 
purposes; and the citation of Bank's research by other researchers.
For instance, a review of the reading lists of 21 graduate 
courses in development economics revealed that Bank research 
products constituted one sixth of the titles recommended. Also, 
journal articles written by Bank authors are cited in other journal 
articles from 20 to 40 percent more frequently than the average 
economics journal article.
Finally, the dissemination of some of the Bank's publications 
reveals the degree of penetration achieved by research output. The 
World Development Report comes first, with more than 120,000 copies 
distributed each year. Other publications appear far behind, such 
as the World Debt Tables with 11,000 copies. Also, the average 
distribution of a Bank's book is about 2,500 copies, with some 
outstanding "best sellers" exceeding 6,000 copies, such as W. 
Baum's Investing in Development (1985) . with more than 20,000 
copies, or J. P. Gittinger's Economic Analysis of Agricultural 
Projects ( 1982) . with more than 15,000 copies.
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The Bank's research program, in FY91, was financed from three 
major sources: first, projects initiated by the different
departments amounted to 54 percent; second, the Research Support 
Budget, a central fund, provided support for projects from both the 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) amounting to 
41 percent; finally, Bank managed research projects supported by 
outside agencies amounted to 5 percent.
The different program objective categories funded and their 
increasing or decreasing relative participation reveal the 
substantive research priorities. For instance, adjustment and debt 
still received the highest but declining share, from 26.6 in FY90 
to 24.0 in FY91, followed by private and public sector reform, 
increasing from 16.1 to 18.1 percent. Also declining was economic 
management, from 17.6 to 13.7 percent, while human resource 
development increased from 14.1 to 14.9 percent. Other areas 
experiencing increases in their relative participation were 
environment and forestry, from 6.9 to 9.7 percent, as well as 
poverty reduction, from 10.5 to 11 percent.
Looking ahead, to future research directions for the nineties, 
the Report identifies three main areas: the "exploration of better 
means to protect the poorest during periods of economic stagnation 
and adjustment," as well as the most cost-effective use of reduced 
public expenditures and the sources of economic growth. Two other 
issues that will be given priority in the near future, within the 
Bank's research program, are "the expansion and efficiency of 
private sector economic activity and the transition from socialist 
to competitive economies in different regions."
The Report also reveals the results of an evaluation, 
conducted in FY91, of 49 completed research projects funded by the 
Research Support Budget. First, the evaluators agreed that "the 
Bank is best suited to carry out applied and empirically based 
research that draws on the Bank's unique access to data bases, 
local researchers, and local government cooperation."
The efforts to disseminate these research results consist 
mainly of the publication of two journals, distributed to a list 
that includes 90 percent subscribers from developing countries, 
12,000 copies of the Economic Review and 5,000 copies of the 
Research Observer.
Additionally, several links were established with outside 
researchers. For instance, in FY91, the Bank used about 45 staff 
years of consultant time on research, while 524 seminars were held 
at the Bank, one third of which were research related and given by 
experts from outside. Also, 13 "eminent scholars" visited the Bank 
under the Visiting Research Fellows Program and the execution of 
the research program led to the establishment of linkages with 75 
institutes or government agencies in developing countries.
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Another outreach activity consists of the Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE). The third of these 
gatherings was held in Washington D.C., in April 1991, covering 
four topics: urbanization, transition in socialist economies,
governance and development, and military expenditures and 
development.
Finally, the cumulative number of working papers released has 
exceeded 700, with 265 issued during FY91, while Bank researchers 
published 36 books and 70 articles in professional journals.
IX. 2. THE IMF/S ANNUAL REPORT
(WDW/25/92 16 SEPTEMBER 1992)
Every year, before the annual meetings of the Board of 
Governors, the Executive Board releases the Annual Report reviewing 
the performance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during 
the financial year ending on April 30.
This year, the first part of the Report contains a brief 
description of the principal developments in the world economy in 
1991 and early 1992, based on the World Economic Outlook (WEO^. 
originally released by the staff in April 1992 (WDW/13/92). The 
second part includes a review of the Fund's policies and 
activities, under the following headings: surveillance; financial 
support for members' policies; technical assistance; trade 
developments; and financial operations.
The surveillance of the members' policies and performance is 
carried out by means of yearly individual consultations, as well as 
multilaterally, through the Board's discussions of the world 
economic outlook, twice a year.
Some of the most important conclusions drawn by the Board from 
these surveillance activities were: first, there is concern over 
the sluggishness exhibited by the economies of the industrialized 
countries; second, by contrast, in the developing countries 
adjustment and reform programs have contributed to a stronger 
economic performance and outlook; third, the transition in the 
former centrally planned economies needs a comprehensive approach 
to structural reform, together with a decisive effort at 
macroeconomic stabilization. Finally, on the debt strategy, the 
Board underlined the evolution toward voluntary, market-based 
reduction of commercial bank debt, as well as the increased 
concessional and nonconcessional relief by official creditors. 
However, it was also recognized that progress in the reduction of 
the debt of low-income countries has been "disappointingly slow," 
especially among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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The overall financial support committed by the Fund for member 
countries rose sharply during 1991/92, with new commitments, in the 
form of 29 arrangements, reaching SDR 8.7 billion, compared with 
SDR 5.6 billion in 1990/91. Three large borrowers— Argentina, 
Brazil and India— accounted for more than two thirds of the total, 
with SDR 6.1 billion, by contrast with last year, when two thirds 
of total commitments were for Eastern European countries. In all, 
nine of these new arrangements were with Western Hemisphere 
countries: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama.
A review of the conditionality applied in stand-by and 
extended arrangements, carried out by the Board in July 1992, 
revealed that the economic performance of the participating 
countries in the 44 programs reviewed, covering 1985-88, was better 
than under similar programs during the early 1980s. Consequently, 
no major operational changes were made to the existent guidelines 
for conditionality, which the Board estimated continue providing an 
appropriate basis for the use of IMF resources.
The Board696XalSDeviewed the operations of the structural 
adjustment facility (SAF) and the enhanced structural adjustment 
facility (ESAF). On the basis of this review, eligibility to use 
the ESAF was extended to 11 additional countries, among which the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras and Nicaragua from the Western
Hemisphere.
In October 1991, the Board carried out an extraordinary
discussion about military expenditures, estimated to represent 
currently around 5 percent of world GDP. In this regard, "most 
Directors indicated that, as military expenditure can have an
important bearing on a member's fiscal policy and external
position, information about such expenditure may be necessary to 
permit a full and internally consistent assessment of the member's 
economic position and policies." Even so, "directors further agreed 
that data on military expenditures should not serve as a basis for 
establishing performance criteria or similar conditions associated 
with Fund-supported programs."
The Fund's financial operations in 1991-92 included: 1)
purchases (drawings) decreased to SDR 5.3 billion from SDR 6.2
billion; 2) repurchases (repayments) also declined to SDR 4.8
billion from SDR 5.4 billion; 3) there was a net transfer of 
resources to the member countries of SDR 0.5 billion, almost the 
same as last year's of SDR 0.6 billion; 4) overdue financial 
obligations (arrears) rose slightly to SDR 3.5 billion, with Peru 
as the only country in the Western Hemisphere with arrears
amounting to SDR 622.8 million, since Panama cleared its overdue 
obligations in February 1992; 5) finally, for the performance of 
these duties the Fund's regular staff increased from 1,763 persons 
from 104 countries in 1990-91 to 1861 persons from 107 countries in
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1991-92, with the total administrative budget increasing from US 
$278 million in the previous financial year to US $338 million.
To conclude, the salient event of this year was the Fund's 
movement towards universal membership. By the end of July 1992, 
nine states of the former Soviet Union had signed the Articles of 
Agreement— Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrghzystan, Latvia, Lituania and Russia. Also, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and Switzerland became members in May 1992. While 
the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, as well as the Federated States of Micronesia and even 
the Republic of San Marino have applied for membership. Thus, a 
truly global monetary system is coming into existence.
IX. 3. THE WORLD BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/27/92 30 SEPTEMBER 1992)
The Annual Report of the World Bank, for the fiscal year (FY) 
covering from 1 July 1991 to 30 June 1992, contains the following 
seven sections: 1) the Executive Board's activities; 2) a global 
perspective of the economic scene; 3) the Bank's operations in FY 
92; 4) the Bank's finances; 5) the activities of the members of the 
World Bank Group, including those of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID); 6) regional perspectives, with a special segment 
dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean; and 7) a summary of 
the projects approved during FY 92.
With the approval by the Board of Governors, last year, of the 
resolution admitting for membership the fifteen former republics of 
the Soviet Union, the "World Bank moved closer to the realization 
of a dream shared forty-eight years ago by the participants in the 
June 1944 Bretton Woods Conference— of an institution that would 
promote the economic development of the unified family of nations."
Still, 1991 was a year when "international conditions for 
growth in developing countries deteriorated," with the economies of 
low- and middle-income countries "virtually stagnated," while the 
seven most industrialized countries "experienced a major slowdown 
in GDP growth."
Total lending commitments by the World Bank Group in FY 92 
amounted to $21.7 billion, of which $15.1 billion from the Bank and 
$6.5 billion from the International Development Agency (IDA), a 
decrease of $1.2 billion in commitments by the Bank and an increase 
of $256 million from IDA, compared to FY 91. Net disbursements by 
the Bank also declined in FY 92 to $1.8 billion, down by $272
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million, while IDA'S net disbursements increased $167 million, to 
$4.4 billion.
By sectors, structural and sectoral adjustment lending 
operations amounted to $5.8 billion in FY 92, accounting for 27 
percent of total WB/IDA commitments, a slight increase from FY 91 
when these operations reached $5.6 billion, or 25 percent of total 
commitments. The largest sector was lending for agriculture and 
rural development, totalling $3.9 billion, or almost 18 percent of 
total commitments.
The segment dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean 
registers that, by the end of FY 92, almost all the countries of 
the region had adopted programs of structural adjustment, with 
"these reforms beginning to bear fruit," since in 1991, "total 
output in Latin America grew by about 3.0 percent, marking the 
first time in four years that per capita income grew in real 
terms." However, the Report also recognizes that "per capita income 
still remains below the level attained in 1979."
Other positive signs noted in Latin America and the Caribbean 
are the positive response by the private sector to greater economic 
stability, since "domestic investment in the region rose by about 
4 percent in 1991; and the renewed access of many countries to 
international capital markets, amounting to $18 billion, as well as 
the return of flight capital.
Also positively noted are the policy adjustments comprising 
the reduction of the maximum tariff in Argentina to 22 percent; 
the elimination of almost all non-tariff barriers in Brazil, as 
well as the abolition of exchange controls in Jamaica, and tax 
reforms in El Salvador and Guyana.
In FY 92 Bank activities in Latin America and the Caribbean 
comprised: 1) total new loan commitments, involving forty-five
operations, increased slightly from $5.2 billion in FY 91 to $5.6 
billion; 2) gross disbursements of $3.9 billion were slightly less 
than the $4.3 billion of FY 91, while repayments of $4.2 billion 
yielded negative net disbursements of $351 million; 3) adjustment 
lending amounted to $1.7 billion, which represented the same 30 
percent of FY 91, with $1 billion, more than half going to Peru; 4) 
cofinancing increased to $3.0 billion, from $1.7 billion in FY 91, 
with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) remaining, for the 
second year, the main source of cofinancing resources, in fourteen 
operations amounting to $2 billion, while Japan remained the main 
source of bilateral cofinancing, providing $775 million in seven 
operations.
Finally, with a budget for FY 92 of $1.12 billion to be 
increased in FY 93 to $1.25 billion and regular staff of 6,046, the 
new Bank President Lewis Preston reinforced the commitment of the
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Bank to the reduction of poverty, defining it as "the overarching 
objective" of the institution. This statement was contained in the 
preface of a Handbook for poverty reduction issued, with an 
operational directive, to provide guidance to task managers and 
guidelines for operations. Also, the publication of the last World 
Development Report, dedicated to the environment and development, 
added to the preparation of private sector assessments, has 
completed the articulation of the strategies which will shape the 
performance of the Bank in the years ahead.
The Bank is "now placing greater attention on concrete issues 
of implementation," with its lending activities "oriented toward 
the Bank's primary missions: poverty reduction, sustainable growth, 
and an active response to environmental concerns." The intention is 
to pursue "these strategies across all relevant programs, rather 
than through narrowly focused special programs." Thus, "the pursuit 
of these objectives and strategies does not neatly translate into 
trends for lending to individual sectors."
IX. 4. THE IMF-WORLD BANK SPRING MEETINGS 
(WDW/12/92 13 MAY 1991)
This year's Bank-Fund spring meetings, held in Washington from 
25 to 28 april, were dominated by two issues: first, the open
eruption of differences among the industrialized countries 
concerning the coordination of their economic policies and second, 
the admission as full members of the Fund and the Bank of the 
former Soviet republics and the consequent approval of a 
substantial package of economic assistance for all of them. The 
degree of consensus revealed by the industrialized countries in 
dealing with the former Soviet Republics contrasted with the 
skirmishes between the United States with Germany, as well as with 
Japan.
The admission of the 15 former Soviet Republics to the Fund 
and the Bank had been well prepared and it was signaled by a 
meeting of a delegation from the Russian Federation with the G- 
Seven, which resulted in the issuance of a separate "statement," in 
addition to the traditional communique, on the package of economic 
assistance.
The delegation of the Russian Federation was presided by the 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, described in the press 
as "a 35-year-old academic with little experience in management 
before his appointment late last year," who was characterized by 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady as "an enormously 
convincing person."
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He must have been very persuasive, because the statement by 
the G-Seven listed the basic ingredients of a comprehensive 
stabilization and reform program, comprising the reduction of the 
budget deficit, curbing monetary growth to bring inflation under 
control, a unified and market-determined exchange rate, as well as 
the legal framework for a market economy and the reform of 
agriculture and energy sectors.
To support these profound transformations, the G-Seven 
approved the $24 billion aid package to Russia, announced on April 
1 by Chancellor Kohl and President Bush in Washington. Also, they 
supported the activation of the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB), 
ratified the next day by the G-Ten, to finance a $6 billion 
currency stabilization fund for the ruble. Additionally, the 
Managing Director of the IMF Michel Camdessus estimated that around 
$20 billion were reguired by the other 14 republics.
Thus, this years's spring meetings will be recorded as those 
during which the Bretton Woods institutions, Mat last” became 
universal, thereby accomplishing, in Mr. Camdessus' terms, 
"something that we have looked forward to since our establishment." 
Thus, if the 4.76 percentage of total IMF quotas granted to all 
these republics is indicative of their relative weight in the world 
economy, altogether they are placed somewhere between Canada and 
Saudi Arabia.
The coordination of economic policies among the industrialized 
countries exhibited less consensus. It all became public with a 
statement by U.S. Treasury Under Secretary David Mulford urging 
Germany to lower its budget deficit. The angry response by 
Germany's State Secretary of Finance Horst Koehler was that "the 
principle of G-7 cooperation rests on the principle that every 
country should keep its own house in order."
This led to the recognition in the communique of the G-Seven 
of four different situations concerning the need to reduce fiscal 
deficits, indicating the lack of consensus on this issue. To 
mention them briefly: 1) countries with large fiscal deficits,
relatively high inflation, excessive wage developments and tight 
monetary policy are advised "to follow a balanced policy approach 
to facilitate improved growth." 2) Other countries with large 
deficits that have experienced weak growth "should avoid actions 
that would jeopardize medium term efforts to consolidate budget 
positions." 3) Still others, where fiscal imbalances have been 
contained and where recession has been avoided, "appropriate 
measures should be pursued to enhance medium term growth prospects 
while maintaining public expenditures under control." 4) Finally, 
in what was perceived as a direct reference to Japan, "in those 
countries with large surpluses and declining growth, policy makers 
should be mindful of the possibilities of strengthening domestic 
demand through appropriate measures."
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Japan also came under the limelight when the G-Seven reviewed 
developments in foreign exchange markets, because in the only 
reference to an individual currency, the Ministers and Governors 
declared that "the decline of the yen since their last meeting was 
not contributing to the adjustment process." This was interpreted 
as a "trade-off" in exchange for the above mentioned fiscal 
license, interpreted in Japan as a signal that a supplementary 
budget will be drafted before the beginning of the summer.
The communiques issued by the other meetings — the G-Ten, the 
Interim and Development Committees—  basically reflected the terms 
of the statement issued by the G-Seven. Even the communique of the 
G-24 developing countries was celebrated by its lack of 
confrontational language. However, in a subdued manner, the G-24 
Ministers, commenting on the admission of the former Soviet 
Republics, "in the light of the growing membership...re­
emphasized. . .the need to preserve the true multilateral character 
of the Bretton Woods institutions, and restated their call that 
both the geographical representation and voting power of the 
present developing member countries in the Fund and the Bank should 
at least be preserved, if not increased."
IX. 5. THE IMF-WORLD BANK ANNUAL MEETINGS 
(WDW/28/92 7 OCTOBER 1992)
These were supposed to be the annual meetings where the 
Bretton Woods institutions were going to celebrate the 
accomplishment of their universalization and where "the great 
transformation" of the former socialist countries would be reviewed 
and supported. After all, even the tiny enclave of San Marino and 
reticent Switzerland, as well as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Marshall Islands had all decided to join, 
bringing the number of members of the Fund to 173, the highest 
ever.
However, just when the financial world was going through the 
preparatory motions of its annual ritual, celebrating the slight 
but significant reduction in interest rates finally adopted the 
week before by the mighty Bundesbank, the reality of the trillion 
dollar daily currency market dawned on the annual meetings. Just a 
few days before, the pound sterling and the Italian lira, closely 
followed by the peseta, broke through the narrow band established 
within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Thus, these 
currencies became helpless victims of intense waves of speculative 
trading, allowed by central bankers who knew better than to oppose 
such mighty forces.
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Evidence shows that currency trading has grown spectacularly 
in the last three years. London remains the largest currency 
market, with daily trading of more than $300 million, followed by 
New York's handling of almost $200 million daily and Tokyo's almost 
$130 million per day. Added to the figures transacted in Frankfurt 
and Hong Kong, this amounts in a day to roughly the equivalent of 
the world's foreign exchange reserves, which in June of this year 
amounted to $1,035 billion. No wonder the central banks avoided the 
confrontation, though they quit only after the Bundesbank had spent 
around $40 billion trying to protect the European ERM.
Amidst such turmoil, an effort was made during the Bank-Fund 
annual meetings, held from 18 to 24 September in Washington, to 
address other issues, such as the situation in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, as well as some of the concerns of the 
developing countries.
For instance, in a statement of three paragraphs, the Group of 
Seven (G-7) reaffirmed the objectives approved at the Munich Summit 
(WDW/21/92) of strengthening world growth "without rekindling 
inflation." The G-7 also noted several measures adopted "to 
reinforce economic recovery," particularly "interest rate 
reductions in a number of countries, as well as the recent 
announcement of the Japanese stimulus package." Finally, the G-7 
"expressed concern about the recent volatility in world financial 
markets," and the Ministers and Governors met with the delegation 
of the Russian Federation to discuss its reform program.
Among other issues addressed, the debt of developing countries 
was mentioned in the communique of the Development Committee, 
chaired for the last time by the Minister of Finance of Chile upon 
the expiration of his two year mandate. It "welcomed the progress 
in the international debt strategy" and registered the fact that 
debt reduction arrangements have been reached with 12 countries, 
including those by Argentina and Brazil with their major creditor 
banks, which in all "account for more than 90 percent of the 
commercial bank debt of the major debtor nations."
Yet, the conclusion was drawn at the end of the meetings by 
the President of the World Bank that one of the main casualties of 
the belt-tightening prevailing in the industrialized countries 
would be future development aid flows.
At the closing ceremonies, President Preston said "donor 
budgets are tight and events of the past week have created further 
uncertainties and pressures." Also, in direct reference to the 
recently announced reduction of ten percent in the aid budget of 
Sweden, Mr. Preston said "after the events of the last week, we 
have seen traditionally generous donors cut back on their overseas 
development aid."
The managing director of the World Bank, Ernest Stern, said 
"it's a sad situation, donors are turning inward," since the 
industrialized countries are "not dealing with their own structural 
problems... they are always in a fiscal bind. And aid is a casualty 
of the Cold War. The lack of ideological competition is reducing 
enthusiasm for aid."
Moreover, Mr. Stern recognized that the annual meetings were 
centered on the European currency crisis. "Nobody talked about 
anything else," he said, "other important subjects were kind of 
shut out. The former Soviet Union disappeared from everybody's 
radar screen, which was a dash of cold water," while "the problems 
of development didn't get much attention, which was a pity."
In these conditions, "sounding despondent and at times angry" 
according to The Financial Times. Mr. Preston concluded, "the 
international community must not turn its back on the poor...They 
need help. It's important that they not be expected to bear the 
burden of adjustment in the rich countries as well as on their 
own." He concluded "there is no more important task facing 
humanity than poverty reduction and sustainable development."
By contrast, Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady in his 
concluding remarks proposed that the G-10 should carry out a study 
on world capital movements, which "have grown dramatically in size 
and complexity." He added, "there is a clear need for a better 
understanding of the changing face of financial markets and the 
implications for the international monetary system.
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